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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court has made social cost a core concept
relevant to the calculation of Fourth Amendment remedies but has never
explained the concept’s meaning. The Court limits the availability of both
the exclusionary rule and civil damages because of their “substantial social
costs.” According to the Court, these costs primarily consist of letting the
lawbreaker go free by excluding evidence or deterring effective police
practices that would lead to more criminal apprehension and prosecution.
But recent calls for systemic police reform by social movements have a
different view of social cost. So too do calls for reforming qualified
immunity. Police illegality—the precondition for exclusion or damages—
itself produces substantial social costs, especially when one considers the
systemic effects of minor illegality on a community-wide scale. The Court
does not currently take account of these social costs, raising the question:
why not? Taking a cue from Professor Ronald Coase’s famous analysis of
the problem of social cost, this Article analyzes why it is necessary for the
Court to refocus its social cost inquiry to include pervasive and corrosive
social costs external to its present doctrinal focus. Surprisingly, given its
analytic centrality, neither the Court nor commentators have clarified what
“social cost” entails or how to calculate it. This Article takes up this task and
charts the unexpected implications that would follow if the Court were to
take its own commitment to minimize “social cost” seriously.
Conceptions of social cost rely on choices of perspective and judgments
about what counts as salient harms that necessitate a remedy. To date, the
predominant perspective the Court takes in constructing and implementing
Fourth Amendment doctrine is the policing perspective. This perspective is
evident both when doctrine is applied to ordinary cases and when doctrine is
shaped by using video evidence such as body-worn cameras that reinforces
law enforcement’s perspective. The result of prioritizing a policing
perspective is to focus on the harms produced by imposing the exclusionary
rule or civil liability on law enforcement’s illegal acts, not upon the harms
suffered by innocent individuals and broader communities. Such a narrow
perspective is a problem because it constructs constitutional meaning in a
way that excludes much of what scholars and the public take the Fourth
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Amendment to mean through the values it protects. Harms that flow from
those citizens who are law enforcement officers—those empowered with the
authority to search, arrest, employ violence, and use deadly force—that
break the law may be particularly acute given the special role they play in
political society. This Article articulates this concern as an inverted “brokenwindows” analysis. Just as minor crime left unregulated within a community
is said to produce greater social harm through the spread of lawlessness,
minor illegality perpetrated by police left unregulated can produce greater
social harm—with sometimes tragic effects—through police impunity. This
latter possibility is insufficiently recognized in theory and practice. Through
such internal criticism of Supreme Court doctrine, this Article begins from
the Court’s own commitment to the analytic centrality of social cost when
constructing the meaning of the Fourth Amendment through its
exclusionary-rule and qualified-immunity doctrines and proposes additional
perspectives necessary for more accurate calculations designed to protect
constitutional rights and promote political community.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law and N. Heyward Clarkson Jr. Professor,
University of South Carolina School of Law. I would like to thank Clint
Wallace for very helpful framing suggestions. I am grateful to Ashwin
Sanzgiri and Bill Kuriger, who each provided outstanding research
assistance. I would also like to thank the journal editors for their many
outstanding suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Violations of the Fourth Amendment’s right of the people to be free
from “unreasonable searches and seizures”1 are notoriously problematic to
remedy. The Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio applied a rule that evidence
acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from
trial, explaining that “[t]o hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment.”2 Justice Holmes explained that the
right without the exclusion remedy would be “a form of words.”3 In the wake
of Mapp, the exclusionary rule became the primary remedy for violations of
1

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (explaining
that if documents seized in violation of the Constitution can be “used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution”).
3 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Justice Holmes further
explained that “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” Id.
2
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the Fourth Amendment. But as the principal remedy against unconstitutional
searches or seizures, the exclusionary rule has a checkered past, subject to
good faith exceptions to ease a central problem Justice Cardozo long ago
identified: the lawbreaker must “go free because the constable has
blundered.”4 The problem of letting a known lawbreaker go free induces
courts to create exceptions to the rule to dampen its impact on policing
practice. Because of judicial attempts to temper the consequences of
violating constitutional strictures, critics allege that Fourth Amendment
cases in general are an “embarrassment,”5 and that the exclusionary rule in
particular has become a “mockery of the original version established in the
early twentieth century.”6
Because of this difficult dynamic—excluding reliable evidence of
criminal wrongdoing because police have themselves acted illegally—the
Court increasingly complains that the rule produces “substantial social
costs.”7 The Court has repeatedly explained that these substantial social costs
are a reason for limiting the scope of exclusion to those cases in which “the
deterrence benefits of suppression [of evidence] . . . outweigh [the rule’s]
heavy costs.”8 On this reasoning, if the enjoyment of the right requires an
exclusionary-rule remedy, and if the remedy incurs “heavy costs,” then
protecting the right entails “substantial social costs.” The Court’s analysis of
the tension between effectuating rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures and “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free”9
therefore makes “social cost” central to the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
In a series of more recent cases, the Court has emphasized that because
the exclusionary rule produces “substantial social costs,” there are good
reasons to limit its application to those cases in which the deterrence purpose
is “most efficaciously served.”10 Benefits of exclusion in terms of its value
in deterring police misconduct must be weighed against the “high cost to

4 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). On good faith, see United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984), and Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995).
5 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 (1997).
6 Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 341, 348 (2013).
7 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–
53 (1987)).
8 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011).
9 Herring, 555 U.S. at 141. But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (“We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part.”).
10 Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
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both the truth and the public safety.”11 From such reasoning, the social costs
that appear to matter most include “setting the guilty free and the dangerous
at large” and the “‘costly toll’ upon truth-seeking and law enforcement
objectives” incurred by suppressing reliable evidence of wrongdoing.12
According to this reasoning, society incurs these costs from providing a
remedy for violations of a particular individual’s right. By contrast, society
benefits when individual wrongdoers face predictable punishment as a
means of incentivizing law abidingness. Framed in this way, the
exclusionary rule harms society more broadly in order to benefit an
individual most specifically when it fails to hold the citizen lawbreaker
accountable. Indeed, by this calculus, the individual benefitted receives an
undeserved windfall. Thus, the Court has warned that applying the
exclusionary rule—bounded by such heavy social costs—“has always been
our last resort, not our first impulse.”13 If the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is tightly linked with the exclusionary remedy as the
Court has explained,14 then by implication from this reasoning, the protection
of the right itself must also implicate substantial social costs.
To speak of a constitutional right as socially costly, however, is a
puzzling claim at odds with a general treatment of rights as public goods with
correlative responsibilities.15 Surprisingly, given its analytic centrality,
neither the Court nor commentators have clarified what “social cost” entails,
how to calculate it, or how it relates to the meaning of Fourth Amendment
rights. This Article takes up this task and charts the unexpected implications
that would follow if the Court were to take its own commitment to minimize
“social cost” seriously.
Currently, the Court’s analysis is one-dimensional, looking only at the
social costs incurred by excluding evidence of the citizen lawbreaker. But if
11

Id. at 232.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998)).
13 Id.
14
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (“[T]he Court . . . clearly stated that use of the
seized evidence involved ‘a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.’” (quoting Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914))).
15 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 319 (1980) (“The point
of a bill of rights or a supreme court is . . . to assure . . . each citizen’s right to protect himself against
exploitation in the name of the greater happiness.”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199
(1977) (“[I]f rights make sense at all, then the invasion of a relatively important right must be a very
serious matter.”); JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 58–59 (1973) (“Legal claim-rights are
indispensably valuable possessions. A world without claim-rights . . . would suffer an immense moral
impoverishment. . . . A world with claim-rights is one in which all persons, as actual or potential
claimants, are dignified objects of respect . . . .”); see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31 (1913)
(explaining how rights have correlative duties).
12
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social cost is relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis—and the Court has
made it doctrinally relevant—then there is no good reason to limit
consideration of social cost to this single dynamic. A more comprehensive
accounting of the total social cost of lawbreaking—by citizen and police—
is necessary. This Article analyzes the implications of taking seriously the
total social cost of Fourth Amendment violations and their remedy.
On closer inspection, social costs accrue when police break the law as
well—costs that are not currently calculated by the Court’s “substantial
social cost” doctrine. When the constable blunders on Justice Cardozo’s
formulation, the constable becomes a lawbreaker too, not simply of a specific
positive law prohibition, but of fundamental law. When law enforcement
becomes the lawbreaker, and when individuals face the risk and reality of
violence and death at the hands of police, the failure of adequate remedies
also produces “substantial social costs” calculated by the effects on both
individuals and the political community.16
Recent incidents of police brutality, such as the murders of George
Floyd and Breonna Taylor, generated widespread protests during the
summer of 2020, which illustrates how these socially dispersed “substantial
social costs” are borne by individuals and communities.17 These cases
demonstrate how when police illegality goes without a remedy, society at
large also suffers harms in addition to those suffered by the individual victim
of the police misconduct.18
As the Court explained in Mapp, “Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence.”19 That charter requires protecting
constitutional rights along with their broad social and political benefits,
16 Even if policing conduct is lawful, the effects can still produce costs on society as a whole. See,
e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 875
(2015) [hereinafter Harmon, Federal Programs] (“Police coercion—in the form of arrests, uses of force,
invasions of privacy, and the like—imposes real, quantifiable costs.”); Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?,
115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 313 (2016) [hereinafter Harmon, Why Arrest?] (“[A]rrests also have more
concrete consequences, and yet the legal tools we generally use to evaluate them are inadequate to
consider whether those costs are justified.”).
17 See, e.g., Audra D.S. Burch, Amy Harmon, Sabrina Tavernise & Emily Badger, The Death of
George Floyd Reignited a Movement. What Happens Now?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/george-floyd-protests-police-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/
GFB9-B48K]; Josh Wood & Tim Craig, As Breonna Taylor Protests Stretch into 12th Week, Calls for
Officers’ Arrests Intensify, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2020, 8:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/as-breonna-taylor-protests-stretch-into-12th-week-calls-for-officers-arrests-intensify/2020/08/
18/ce6f2b9a-d823-11ea-930e-d88518c57dcc_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7CJ8-MVVR];
Jocelyn
Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 781 (2021).
18 The Court warned: “The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.” 367 U.S. at 660.
19 Id. at 659.
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which the Court often describes as essential to liberty.20 Failure to live up to
rule-of-law ideals inflicts harm on the political body as a whole. It can
delegitimize governing authority and burden equal political standing for all
citizens. The Court’s current social cost analysis does not consider how law
enforcement legitimacy requires an effective means for both individual
officers and police departments as institutions to internalize constitutional
norms in practice.21 When law enforcement practices—backed by implicit
Supreme Court sanction—alter constitutional norms, they change
constitutional meanings in ways that undermine the democratic and
constitutional legitimacy of those practices.
The problem of social cost sweeps wider than establishing the liabilities
between cops and robbers regarding the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence.22 Rather, the comprehensive problem of social cost for official
illegality occurs whenever the Fourth Amendment is violated without a
remedy—no matter whether the state seeks to prosecute an individual and
introduce evidence. Indeed, the exclusionary rule has always been a limited
remedy, inapplicable when no evidence of wrongdoing results from an
illegal search.23 And the Court has never allowed civil remedies to flourish

20 Early due process and incorporation cases all described the essential protection for liberty, asking
whether a criminal procedure right belongs to “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650 (observing that protecting the
“security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
21 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 58–59 (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY] (exploring the relation between willingness to obey the law and the perception of law enforcement
legitimacy); Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 307, 329 (2009) [hereinafter Tyler, Legitimacy] (arguing that the legal authorities’ legitimacy
depends on their internalizing a responsibility to live up to certain moral values); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies
and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 349–56 (2011) (discussing
the need to train officers to build community trust).
22 See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (1984) (arguing that often there is a difference between
the conduct rules directed at specific actors and the rules of decision a court applies).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“The purpose of the exclusionary
rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim . . . .”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
223 (1983) (exclusion is “an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct”); see also Christopher Slobogin,
Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 373 (noting the limitations
of the exclusionary rule in the context of behavioral theory); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment
as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1257–63 (1983) (discussing the Court’s
disregard for the impact of police intrusion on the innocent); William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of
the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 449 (1997) (explaining that the exclusionary
rule applies only in limited search scenarios and not in police beatings or shootings when there is no
evidence to suppress).
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as a robust alternative, though they might seem appropriate, despite the fact
that the individual stakes are often too small to pursue legal action even as
the aggregate costs of small-scale illegality are large.24
When exclusion of evidence is irrelevant, civil liability can function as
an alternative remedy for illegal police conduct perpetrated against both
innocent and culpable citizens alike. But here too, the Court interposes social
cost analysis as a means of limiting the availability of constitutional remedies
through a doctrine of qualified immunity.25 The Court admonishes that
“permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial
social costs.”26 Like the social cost analysis of the exclusionary rule, the
Court’s qualified-immunity analysis is one-dimensional, considering only
the costs incurred by law enforcement and society at large from the potential
overdeterrence of purportedly desirable, robust policing practices.27 Leaving
constitutional violations without a remedy for many innocent citizens
highlights the extent to which the Court’s one-dimensional “substantial
social cost” doctrine fails to provide an accurate accounting of the actual
costs society incurs from illegal police actions.
Policing practices that violate the Constitution but do not give rise to
excludable evidence can—and do—become systemic. When police engage
in illegal street stops and frisks, or use unreasonable force, or perform
searches without authority, their actions become systemic practices that have
systemic effects, which individual instances of exclusion do not remedy. In
the case of technologically enhanced surveillance practices, law enforcement
can invade the privacy of far more citizens in the search for the few
lawbreakers outside the purview of the exclusionary rule.28 On closer
inspection, as this Article explores, the problem of uncalculated social costs
of police practices cannot be resolved by simply asserting that a supposed

24

See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
See infra Section I.B.
26 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
27
See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
28 Think here of the effects of widespread use of camera surveillance or access
to home security devices. See Drew Harwell, Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring Has Partnered
with 400 Police Forces, Extending Surveillance Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-has-partneredwith-police-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/ [https://perma.cc/239E-GTM3]; Jon Schuppe, Amazon
Is Developing High-Tech Surveillance Tools for an Eager Customer: America’s Police, CNBC
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/08/amazon-is-developing-high-tech-surveillance-toolsfor-police.html [https://perma.cc/V7EP-95C5]; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth
Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 551 (2017) (analyzing “the ever-increasing ability for
surveillance technologies to track individuals through the data trails they leave behind”). But see
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018) (holding that a warrant is required to access
historical cell-site data held by a third party).
25
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constitutional equilibrium exists when police have access to enhanced
surveillance capacities for which exclusion of evidence can rarely ever serve
as a check.29 The systemic use of technology produces costs external to the
particular occasion in which the exclusionary rule might apply.
Systemic policing practices that violate the Constitution are also
connected to political priorities in ways that the Court’s social cost analysis
does not reflect. Placing additional law enforcement officers on the streets to
conduct more stops and frisks in pursuit of order-maintenance policing is a
relatively low-technology, resource-intensive way to make policing present
in people’s daily lives.30 The political decision in many jurisdictions to
pursue a “broken-windows” approach to law enforcement that focuses on
nonviolent, relatively minor offenses has effects on the interaction between
discretionary policing and law-abiding citizens.31 Even in the original
description of broken-windows policing, George Kelling and James Wilson
reported that “[y]oung toughs were roughed up, people were arrested ‘on
suspicion’ or for vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed.
‘Rights’ were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the
serious professional criminal, who avoided violence and could afford a
lawyer.”32 Policing illegality was built into the model. This Article argues
that an inverse broken-windows phenomenon is a more troubling
development of unremedied Fourth Amendment violations. When police
engage in everyday, low-level unconstitutional actions, it erodes rule-of-law
principles throughout the community. These rippling effects of official
illegality produce diffuse social and political harms with corrosive effects

29

See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 481–82 (2011) (arguing that equilibrium adjustment is a way for courts to maintain a “balance
of police power”). But see David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 237–41 (2015) (arguing against the assumptions of balance
and continuity over time on which a conception of equilibrium relies).
30 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29–30, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/
03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/9EH3-J757]. For critical commentary, see Thomas P.
Crocker, Order, Technology, and the Constitutional Meanings of Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 685, 693–702, 711–14 (2013); and BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6–22 (2001).
31 See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1165–
66 (1966). On the role of violence in how we view the propriety of particular kinds of policing, see DAVID
ALAN SKLANSKY, A PATTERN OF VIOLENCE: HOW THE LAW CLASSIFIES CRIMES AND WHAT IT MEANS
FOR JUSTICE 3 (2021) (“The failure of police reform . . . is partly a story about a decline in the salience
of violence in the rules that govern law enforcement, and in our thinking about the police more broadly.”).
32 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 30, at 33; see also HARCOURT, supra note 30, at 127–30 (further
describing broken-windows policing and its dependence on frivolously arresting people under a system
of broad criminal laws).
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on communities that are left uncalculated by the current “substantial social
cost” doctrine.
Unaccounted social costs not only affect the law-abiding citizen subject
to unlawful searches that discover no excludable evidence but also subject
self-governing citizens to a more “permeating police surveillance”33 that
“may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society,” as Justice Sotomayor observed in United
States v. Jones.34 Systemic harms to democratic society follow from systemic
constitutional violations. These harms are felt by communities who feel less
free and less safe as a result of police practices of the kind at issue in the
deaths of unarmed children and young men such as Tamir Rice and Amir
Locke, among many others.35 Recognition that the social cost of
unconstitutional police actions can be “inimical to democratic society” also
suggests that the problem is not merely one of calibrating the scope of a
constitutional right, but also of setting structural boundaries between a selfgoverning sovereign people and the executive offices tasked with law
enforcement responsibilities.36 In this way, rights and structure are mutually
implicated by the problem of social cost the Court raises.
Social harms result from the systemic effects of unconstitutional police
conduct. These harms include a loss of law enforcement legitimacy,37 a
decline in respect for government, a loss of equal dignity as respected
members of the political community, a loss of physical safety, and the
dampening of public and political activities the Constitution protects.38 The
33

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)); see also Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive
Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723
(2014) (defining panvasive surveillance as “the idea that modern government’s efforts at keeping tabs on
the citizenry routinely and randomly reach across huge numbers of people, most of whom are innocent
of any wrongdoing”).
35 Emma G. Fitzsimmons, 12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/us/boy-12-dies-after-being-shot-by-clevelandpolice-officer.html [https://perma.cc/AG9Y-REZV]; Tim Arango, No Charges Against Police in Amir
Locke Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/us/amir-lockeshooting-no-charges.html [https://perma.cc/UE5Q-4LPY].
36 Rights and structure can form “interlocking gears,” both contributing to progress toward equality
and liberty, as Professor Gerken argues. Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking
Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 588, 594 (2015).
37 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME
& JUST. 283, 291 (2003) (proposing that community members’ perception of governmental authority is a
key factor in determining public behavior); Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated
Communities: Innovation and Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (2008) (arguing that tougher
policing practices cause communities to seek alternatives to police).
38 For further discussion of the effects of unconstitutional police conduct on political community, see
Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 332–45 (2010).
34
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continuation of a large social movement aimed at highlighting the social
costs of insufficiently regulated use of police violence makes the
constitutional question of social cost acute and highlights the one-sided and
incomplete analysis in which the Supreme Court has to date engaged.39 The
Court proclaims the problem of the exclusionary rule’s social costs as if they
were the inevitable result of objective legal analysis, when in fact any
conclusion about overall costs depends entirely upon choices the Court
makes about what counts as a cost. These choices have effects for the lived
experience of constitutional law in the life of the political community. This
Article argues that the Court’s current choice to limit its social cost
calculation to the effects upon policing practice and the harms of letting a
lawbreaker go free lacks justification and that any accurate calculation must
account for the total social cost of a constitutional rule that facilitates or
inhibits policing practice.40
To protect the Fourth Amendment, the Court needs a framework for
analyzing “social cost” that includes the diffuse costs borne by law-abiding
citizens, the costs of lost law enforcement legitimacy, the harm from lost
respect for government, and the cost to political and civic engagement that
improper control of public space engenders. The Court makes social cost into
a constitutive element of Fourth Amendment analysis but fails to implement
this insight in a more comprehensive, rights-protective way, instead using it
as a counterintuitive means of limiting the scope of privacy rights. Because
the Court focuses on individual citizen–police transactions, the systemic
effects remain largely unexamined, as if they were the product of an invisible
hand guiding individual market decisions. But citizen–police encounters are
not market transactions, and the Court’s social cost doctrine does not have a
mechanism for internalizing holistic issues when matters of government
structure and democratic processes are at stake.41 Using insights about the
39 See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2ZqRyOU [https://perma.cc/5GL2EPZS]; Adam Serwer, The Next Reconstruction, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2020, at A43; Juliet Hooker, Black Lives
Matter and the Paradoxes of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic Repair,
44 POL. THEORY 448, 463 (2016).
40 Balancing rights is itself conceptually more complicated than is often acknowledged. See Jeremy
Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 199 (2003); see also THOMAS
P. CROCKER, OVERCOMING NECESSITY: EMERGENCY, CONSTRAINT, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 164–93, 192 (2020) (arguing “that neither ‘security’ nor ‘liberty’ can serve as unexamined categories that give priority to a particular governing policy”); Thomas P. Crocker, Who
Decides on Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1511, 1517–18 (focusing on the difficult question of who decides
how much liberty must be forgone to achieve adequate security).
41 For discussion of the pervasiveness of such market-oriented thinking, see Jedediah Britton-Purdy,
David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy
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problem of social cost first articulated by Professor Ronald Coase, I argue
that it is clear that the Court’s doctrine fails to account for a range of social
externalities to the individual citizen–police encounter, while failing to
explain why only the few social costs on which it focuses are most relevant.42
The Court already looks beyond the individual citizen–police encounter for
externalities—costs beyond the policing transaction—without explaining the
failure to consider aggregate costs of police illegality. Because the Court
focuses on particular cases to guide doctrine with systemic effects,
it is important to bring into focus the full social cost of individual citizen–
police encounters.
Recent calls for broad police reform are based upon recognition that
unconstitutional police actions, such as the killings of George Floyd and
Breonna Taylor, produce widespread social costs that have so far not been
included in the Court’s “substantial social cost” doctrine. This Article
provides a defense of including comprehensive analysis of social cost, argues
that the more serious social harm comes from systemic law enforcement
misconduct, and suggests a path forward for a more comprehensive social
cost calculus. The analysis that follows utilizes a method of internal critique.
The argument begins from the doctrinal commitments the Court has already
articulated, demonstrates the conceptual incompleteness and incoherence of
the Court’s current approach, and then uses this internal tension to suggest a
solution that is grounded in these existing conceptual and doctrinal
precedents.
Part I first explains how the argument conceptually and
methodologically borrows from Coase’s famous analysis of the problem of
social cost.43 From the general problem of social cost, Part I then describes
the Court’s doctrinal focus on “social cost” in analyzing the scope and
application of the exclusionary rule. When exclusion of evidence is
unavailable or inapplicable, then civil damages are meant to provide an
alternative remedy. Following the reasoning of its exclusionary-rule
jurisprudence, however, the Court limits the availability of civil remedies
when the social costs exceed the expected benefits, concerned primarily that
remedies do not curtail robust policing practices. As this Part explains, social
cost is a central Fourth Amendment doctrinal concept that the Court
incompletely analyzes. As Part II diagnoses, the Court’s incomplete analysis
of social cost arises because the Court takes the perspective of police, not the
Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1800 (2020), and BERNARD
E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 8–
12, 32–34 (2011).
42 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at 1.
43 Id. at 837–77.
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citizen, when constructing Fourth Amendment rights and remedies.
Prioritizing doctrinal rules designed for their easy administration by law
enforcement, the Court adapts Fourth Amendment rights to the needs of law
enforcement. Use of technology such as dash-mounted or body-worn
cameras risks further entrenching law enforcement perspectives in tension
with rights as limits on state actors.
Yet there are insufficient grounds for prioritizing the policing
perspective, as Part III explains. The social cost of any Fourth Amendment
rule requires a more holistic analysis that captures the experiences of
individuals and communities who are subject to the policing practices
doctrinal rules either enable or inhibit. This much is implied by the Coasean
approach to social cost and follows from the nature of rights as limits to—
not enablers of—state policing power. Following an inverted brokenwindows logic aids in analyzing why it is important to remedy a particular
police action—even if a lawbreaker goes free—in order to preserve the
integrity of the whole. Because the Court is already committed to analyzing
the Fourth Amendment’s meaning in terms of its social costs, an internal
reappraisal of exclusionary-rule and qualified-immunity doctrinal reasoning
to include the costs imposed on individuals and communities from particular
policing practices is necessary. A recalibrated calculus of social cost would
come much closer to realizing the structural ideal of the people’s Fourth
Amendment rights against police intrusion into their everyday lives.
I.

THE SOCIAL COST OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The basic structure of a Fourth Amendment complaint is not unlike that
for any other civil liberties violation: official government agents have
violated a constitutionally protected right, requiring a judicial sanction. For
example, a free speech claim might argue that a prosecution for speechrelated activities violates the First Amendment,44 or a law forbidding certain
speech-related activities chills protected speech.45 In each case, the
constitutional infirmity can be rectified by judicial declaration and injunction
against enforcing the unconstitutional law. By contrast, Fourth Amendment
rights violations occur not because the application of a substantive law
violates the Constitution, but because the means by which evidence has been
acquired violates the Constitution.
This gap between substance and procedure makes Fourth Amendment
violations notoriously difficult to remedy, since the dominant means—
44

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1978); Leslie Kendrick,
Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1649–50 (2013).
45
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exclude the evidence found from the trial of the accused—is a rather indirect
sanction.46 No individual police officer need suffer official sanction when the
prosecutor’s key evidence is suppressed. There is usually no law to be
declared unconstitutional, and the Court has admonished that injunctions are
available only to remedy official policies that violate constitutional
standards.47 The innocent person harmed will have little incentive or
opportunity to hold an officer liable for damages that may be monetarily
insignificant, even if personally important.48 Navigating the high standard of
qualified immunity will also provide no remedy for unconstitutional acts that
have not met the Court’s standard for “clearly established.”49 The Court has
deliberately made remedies other than exclusion difficult to obtain.
Yet when the individual constable errs in conducting a fruitful search,
thereby violating the Fourth Amendment, the criminal gets a windfall;
though the state has proof of criminal wrongdoing, it is unable to utilize its
evidence.50 As a result of this windfall, the Court has granted increased
consideration to the fact that “[e]ach time the exclusionary rule is applied it
exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment
rights.”51 This consideration is based in part on a countervailing recognition
“that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding
functions of judge and jury.”52 But the primary social cost the Court identifies
is the cost of letting the lawbreaker go free measured against what the Court

46 See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396–
404 (1995).
47 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
48 In seeking money damages, claimants must run the qualified-immunity gauntlet of proving that
the officer’s specific actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established by the Supreme
Court. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987);
see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”).
49 See Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640 (“The contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that [every]
reasonable official would [have] underst[ood] that what he is doing violates that right.”); Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
50 In response to this dynamic in which the criminal gets a windfall but other remedies seem too
insubstantial, one influential commentator explains, “I have long believed that the exclusion of relevant
criminal evidence is a high price to pay for judicial enforcement of the fourth amendment and that the
exclusionary sanction is an evil in itself. I believe, however, that it is a necessary evil because the
supposed alternatives to it are pie in the sky.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 429 (1974).
51 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
52 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
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believes is a minimal potential deterrent against future police illegality.53 The
Court explains that the goal of exclusion is to deter future unlawful police
conduct by depriving the state of the benefits of its own illegality. As a result,
the Court begins—and increasingly ends—an analysis of social cost with the
exclusionary rule’s deterrence effect.
As a methodology, this single dynamic—the costs of excluding
prosecutorial evidence relative to the deterrent effect on police—fails to
account for the actual social costs it purports to calculate. A brief detour
through one aspect of Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost will aid
in seeing better what the task of calculating social cost entails.54 After that,
this section turns in greater detail to analyze how the Court balances social
cost with the deterrent benefits of exclusion, and of civil liability.
A. A Methodological Note on Ronald Coase
and the Problem of Social Cost
Let’s postulate that we the people suffer social costs from both
exclusion and nonexclusion of illegally obtained evidence. In either case, a
lawbreaker—the offending citizen or the unlawful police officer—might go
unpunished, violating society’s expectations that individuals must conform
to its legal norms. The question is which costs are greater. To use the form
of the question about social cost that Professor Coase posed in another
context: “The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.”55 But which is the
more serious harm—letting the citizen lawbreaker go free or allowing the
law enforcement officer to break the law without remedy?
To determine how to analyze these social costs, we must better
understand the value of what is gained and lost through either exclusion or
nonexclusion—or liability or nonliability—when the existence of official
wrongdoing is a constant.56 The choice has a measure of tragedy to it, not in
the sense that society remains blind to harms it cannot reconcile, but
that the Court remains blind to the broader problem of social cost its
decisions impose.57

53 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (arguing that because “police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system,” merely negligent conduct does not
warrant exclusion).
54 Coase, supra note 42, at 2.
55 Id.
56 The nature of this core inquiry parallels that raised by Coase in how to resolve problems where
liabilities should occur: “What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value
of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it.” Id.
57 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–20 (1978).
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Rather than an analysis of “frictionless transaction costs,” this Article
draws inspiration from Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost for the idea that
when judges and policymakers assign entitlements and liabilities, they must
recognize the complexity of calculating the total social cost. For when
“comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to
compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements.”58
Thus, to analyze only the effects in one direction—say, the harms from
railway sparks on burned crops, to use one of Coase’s examples—without
considering the total effects of broader social costs in the allocation of
resources is to derive an incomplete picture that is in this sense partially
blind.59 Any calculation that purports to reflect the social cost of such a
resource allocation—or an assignment of liabilities—will be inaccurate,
leaving many costs uncalculated despite their salience and aggregate scope.
Likewise, to draw the Coasean analogy outside the economic domain,
focusing narrowly only upon the social costs incurred by holding police
liable produces an inaccurate calculation. This is because “the total effect of
these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account”60—
where “these arrangements” are to be understood as including distributions
of policing power, social and community effects, as well as individual rights
and political inclusion within a system of criminal justice.
Thus, in borrowing a part of the title from Coase’s work, my approach
here also borrows a methodology. The Court has made the social cost
relevant to the scope and meaning of Fourth Amendment rights. So, if we
take the social cost of Fourth Amendment remedies—or their absence—
seriously, then we must examine more closely what the total social cost of
providing or withholding remedies would be. Otherwise, like turning the
right merely into “a form of words,”61 talk of social cost as a “substantial
social cost” doctrine becomes an empty incantation, not a serious legal
analysis. To see why, we must first examine in detail how social cost enters
58 Coase, supra note 42, at 34. For analysis of Coase’s central insight along these lines, see Pierre
Schlag, Coase Minus the Coase Theorem—Some Problems with Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis,
99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 184 (2013); Deirdre McCloskey, The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. ECON. J.
367, 369 (1998); Brett M. Frischmann & Alain Marciano, Understanding The Problem of Social Cost,
11 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 329, 348–49 (2014); and Steven G. Medema, Debating Law’s Irrelevance:
Legal Scholarship and the Coase Theorem in the 1960s, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 159, 161 (2014). This
approach is distinguished from the enormous literature that uses the Coase theorem to analyze frictionless
transactions with zero transaction costs. For early statements along these lines, see Guido Calabresi, The
Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 729 (1965);
and GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966).
59 See Coase, supra note 42, at 30–34. On the relation between relative blindness and constitutional
meaning, see Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2007).
60 Coase, supra note 42, at 43.
61 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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into the Court’s reasoning over the scope of Fourth Amendment rights
and remedies.
B. Balancing the Cost of Exclusion
Despite affirmative claims that Fourth Amendment rights are closely
connected to the remedy of evidentiary exclusion, the Court has more
recently emphasized the basic claim that “[t]he fact that a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred . . . does not necessarily mean that the
exclusionary rule applies.”62 If the constitutional violation is causally
unrelated to the eventual discovery of evidence because, for example,
officers acquired it from a separate and independent source, then the Court
reasons that the exclusionary rule offers no relevant deterrence.63 In addition,
if officers would have inevitably discovered the evidence despite the
unconstitutional act, the Court likewise argues that exclusion does not
apply.64
Moreover, there are occasions, including good faith error, in which the
Court will not apply the exclusionary rule because the costs are claimed to
be too high, even when the unconstitutional act is the sole source of the
evidence.65 When police rely in good faith upon a search warrant that later
proves inadequate to support the necessary probable cause, the Court
explained that there are inadequate deterrence benefits in light of the social
costs to justify exclusion of evidence.66 The Court admonished that
“[p]articularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good
faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit
conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal
justice system.”67
This idea—that letting the guilty go free offends the judicial process—
has its roots in a narrowing of Mapp, where the Court reasoned that “the
[exclusionary] rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment

62 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009). The Herring Court explained further: “We
have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment
violation.” Id. at 141.
63
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–38 (1988).
64 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
65 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08, 913 (1984) (articulating the “good faith” exception
to the exclusionary rule). The Court also refused to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the Fourth
Amendment requirement that police knock and announce before executing a warrant. Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).
66 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
67 Id. at 907–08.
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against unreasonable searches and seizures.”68 In terms of whose illegality
offends the integrity of the courts more—the police officer’s or the criminal
defendant’s—the Supreme Court asserted that the analysis “is essentially the
same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent
purpose.”69 As the Court further explained, “For exclusion to be appropriate,
the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh [the rule’s] heavy
costs.”70 In this way, deterrence is a forward-looking remedy designed to
influence law enforcement behaviors by altering incentives. If law
enforcement officers know that evidence obtained to prosecute a defendant
is at risk of being suppressed unless they follow constitutional rules, then
they have incentives to comply with the conduct rules the Court provides.
Following this logic, if the aim is to alter official behavior, then use of the
exclusionary rule in cases that lack a means of changing incentives would
fail to fulfill a deterrent purpose.
When weighing the social cost of letting the lawbreaker go free, the
Court has come to focus primarily on the benefit of deterring unlawful police
conduct. In keeping with the idea that some illegality might have occurred
in good faith, the Court in Herring v. United States emphasized that the
central question “turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of
exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.”71 Courts must balance
culpability in terms of its deterrent effect, mindful of the fact that “police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter
it, and sufficiently culpable” to overcome the social cost of excluding
evidence.72
In Herring, a police officer relied in good faith upon information that
there was an outstanding arrest warrant—later found erroneous—which he
used as probable cause to stop, arrest, and search Mr. Herring. Though he
had no actual legal grounds for the search incident to arrest that uncovered
evidence of wrongdoing, the Court reasoned that the police officer had no
culpable state of mind because he reasonably believed his actions were
authorized by a warrant. The fact that there was a database error was not the
officer’s fault. And even though this error rendered the initial arrest
unjustified, the Court concluded that because the officer acted pursuant to
what he believed to be a valid arrest warrant, there was no illegal conduct to
deter on the officer’s part.

68
69
70
71
72
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United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976)).
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011).
555 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 144.
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Without culpability for knowingly breaking the law, the Court reasoned
that a mere incremental benefit in deterring police conduct would not
outweigh the substantial social costs in excluding the evidence found during
the search incident to arrest.73 For the exclusionary rule to provide more
benefits than costs, the Court’s analysis must be “focused on the efficacy of
the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.”74 And, as
the Herring Court repeated, “We have never suggested that the exclusionary
rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal
deterrence.”75 Because the officer had acted pursuant to a warrant, the Court
concluded that no more than marginal deterrence value would exist in
excluding evidence in this case.76
Although the Court offers no formula, it appears that “marginal
deterrence” can tolerate far more than marginal amounts of illegality. In prior
case law, the Supreme Court through Justice Thomas held that the common
law heritage of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for the home required
law enforcement officers to knock and announce their presence before
attempting to enter.77 To do so at common law established the authority for
an officer to enter, in contrast to a trespasser, and overrode the general
principle that a person’s home is his castle.78 So called “no-knock” warrants
would be reasonable, and thus consistent with the Fourth Amendment, only
when officers could cite specific circumstances that knocking and
announcing their presence “would be dangerous or futile, or that it would
inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the
destruction of evidence.”79 Fast-developing circumstances when serving a
warrant might create an exigency that would justify sudden forcible entry.80
73

Id. at 141 (“[T]o the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some
incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social costs.”
(quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987))).
74 Id.
75 Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998)).
76 See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
463, 511 (2009) (“[T]oday the Supreme Court threatens to leave most violations of the Fourth
Amendment without any remedy, not even on paper.”).
77 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (“Given the longstanding common-law
endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”). In Hudson, the Court further
explained, “The common-law principle that law enforcement officers must announce their presence and
provide residents an opportunity to open the door is an ancient one.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
589 (2006).
78 Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931–32.
79 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
80 See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36–37 (2003) (holding no-knock entries reasonable under
exigent circumstances).
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In Hudson v. Michigan, there was no mistaken belief about whether law
enforcement’s conduct was permissible because of an intervening database
mistake or the like.81 The Fourth Amendment requires that, in the absence of
an exigent circumstance, police knock and announce their presence and wait
for acknowledgement before they can be justified in forcibly entering a home
in furtherance of a search warrant. In violation of that requirement, police
waited only a few seconds after announcing their presence to enter Booker
Hudson’s home.82
Despite explaining that the “knock-and-announce” rule is an element of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, however, the Court in Hudson refused
to exclude evidence obtained after police violated it.83 The Court reasoned
that the causal connection between the constitutional violation and the
discovery of evidence was too attenuated for exclusion to provide
appropriate deterrence. According to the Court, attenuation occurs when “the
interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated
would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”84 The
exclusionary rule, the Court explained, protects a constitutional rule that
“citizens are entitled to shield ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects’
from the government’s scrutiny.”85 But the knock-and-announce rule
protects a different interest, and therefore “the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable.”86 Accordingly, “deterrence of knock-and-announce violations
is not worth a lot” because in the Court’s judgment, there is no strong
incentive to violate the requirement.87
In contrast to what it saw as the relatively worthless deterrence benefit
of excluding the evidence obtained subsequent to the knock-and-announce
violation, the Court explained that “[t]he costs here are considerable.”88 First,
there is the “grave adverse consequence . . . viz., the risk of releasing
dangerous criminals into society.”89 Second, there is the problem of imposing
a “massive remedy” of exclusion for a seemingly small-potatoes

81

547 U.S. at 588.
Id. at 588–89.
83 Id. at 593.
84 Id.; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and
Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1761–65 (2008) (noting that the rule in Hudson is that “exclusion
must serve an interest protected by the rule”).
85 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593 (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
86 Id. at 594. The Court explained that these alternative interests include protecting life and limb from
violence at the unexpected entry, protecting property from damage, and protecting privacy and dignity
from embarrassment from the sudden entry. Id.
87 Id. at 596.
88 Id. at 595.
89 Id.
82
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constitutional violation, which would generate a “flood” of litigation over
difficult, fact-specific, circumstance-dependent practice.90 Third, the
overdeterrence might lead officers to delay entry longer than legally
necessary, placing them at risk of violence and harm and raising the risk of
evidence destruction.91 These, the Court reasons, add up to “substantial social
costs” that far exceed the “minimal” incentives police have to violate the
constitutional rule.92 Because officers were warranted in obtaining the
evidence, penalizing the unconstitutional manner in which they executed the
warrant would provide little benefit in light of the social costs on which the
Court focused.
The values that the knock-and-announce rule protects do not form any
part of the social cost calculation, the Court reasons, because they do not
involve blinding the government to evidence it is entitled to seek. These
values include an interest in protecting life and limb from violence that might
ensue from surprised and frightened residents initiating self-defense. In
addition, there are interests in avoiding the destruction of the searched
person’s property, including the door, as well as privacy and dignity interests
of household residents surprised by the sudden, unannounced entry of
police.93
Although privacy and dignity are values at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, when confronted with their violation, the Hudson
Court nonetheless refused to make their protection part of the social cost
calculation.94 According to the Court, any privacy intrusion that occurred as
a result of the no-knock entry was not causally related to the evidence
obtained, and thus was unprotected by exclusion.95 Violating the knock-andannounce rule, the Court reasoned, was ancillary to the question of whether
excluding the evidence discovered on the other side of the door furthered the
90

Id.
Id. (fearing “police officers’ refraining from timely entry after knocking and announcing”).
92 Id. at 596.
93 Id. at 594; see also L.A. Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 611, 615–16 (2007) (finding police did
not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the wrong home, where a sleeping couple was found in
bed nude).
94 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (finding that the Fourth Amendment “protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment protects against
“unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual”); David Alan Sklansky,
Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
1069, 1070 (2014) (“Privacy has long been thought the core concern of the Fourth Amendment, and there
is more talk about privacy today than ever before.”); see also William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment
Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 38 (2001) (noting that, despite the importance of
privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, “even the slightest exposure of an item to the public can defeat
a privacy claim”).
95 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592.
91
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interest of deterrence. Because of the lack of connection, the Court calculated
the social cost of potentially excluding evidence to be too high. Under this
reasoning, however, the purported high social costs of exclusion are never
weighed against the social costs to personal privacy, dignity, and security
within the home. The Court can justify a claim that exclusion of evidence
entails high social costs only by refusing to calculate the social costs to
individuals and communities from the violation of their privacy and dignity.
A full accounting would undermine Hudson’s rationale.
In Davis v. United States, another case limiting the use of the
exclusionary rule, the Court was explicit in weighing the deterrence benefits
against the “substantial social costs generated by the rule.”96 As the Court
explained, “Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and
society at large.”97 Not only do courts have to ignore evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, but “its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the
truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.”98
Such pervasive effects on society entail a substantial—yet uncalculated—
cost through a remedy about which the Court expresses considerable doubt.
Following the reasoning of Hudson and Herring, the Court concluded
“that society must swallow this bitter pill when necessary, but only as a ‘last
resort.’”99 Moreover, there is no deterrence benefit to be gained by
retroactively applying a constitutional rule to conduct that police at the time
would not know was unconstitutional. In Davis, the police had conducted a
search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of the occupants—a search which a
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant would decide
violated the Fourth Amendment.100 But to apply the rule of Gant retroactively
to police conduct in Mr. Davis’s case would provide no deterrent benefit, the
Court reasoned, and thus would not pay for the substantial social costs the
rule imposes. As the Court explained, “[W]hen the police act with an
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when
their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence
rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.”101
96 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591). But see Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the
Age of Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1035, 1043 (2008) (arguing that the Court has not always treated exclusion as a “last resort”).
100 Davis, 564 U.S. at 235–36; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
101 Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Leon,
468 U.S. at 909; then quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009); and then quoting Leon,
468 U.S. at 908 n.6, 919).
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Reasoning outward, the Davis Court referenced costs of increasing
scope: from the truth-seeking function of a particular trial, to the judicial
system more broadly, to society at large. Each suffers harms when the Court
imposes the bitter pill of exclusion “when necessary,” though the exact
nature of the harm is left unspecified. On the other side of the ledger, the
Court reasoned that benefits accrue only from deterring future unlawful
police conduct. Even then, “[r]eal deterrent value is a necessary condition
for exclusion, but is not a sufficient one.”102
The calculation of social cost thus has an asymmetric structure. Costs
include both broad effects on society as well as narrow considerations of
policing practice, but the benefits are all focused on the narrow deterrence
effects on policing practice from which any broader social benefit is
incidental or inferred. On the one hand, what counts as social cost to be
weighed against deterrence is expansive—including society’s general
interest in avoiding the risk of freeing dangerous criminals. And in the case
of Hudson, it is also highly particular to policing practice—considering
whether police might unnecessarily delay entry because of heightened
Fourth Amendment privacy scruples. On the other hand, the benefits are
narrowly confined to effects on police practice, not the effects on citizens
surprised by the sudden entry of police. Any broader social benefits that
privacy protections confer, according to the Court, are incidental to the
incentives that exclusion might structure for the exclusion calculation’s
primary focus: police.
C. Qualified Immunity as an Alternative Cost Calculation?
Exclusion is not the only remedy available when police violate
constitutional rights. Individuals who have suffered constitutional harms
may bring suit in federal court to seek damages against law enforcement
officers who acted illegally. As the Court in Hudson instructs, failure to
exclude evidence does not end the legal avenues an aggrieved individual may
pursue.103 Even if the damages to a person’s broken door are not large, they
are still potentially compensable, the Court explained.104 In response to the
worry that the failure to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the
knock-and-announce rule would remove all incentives for police to comply,
the Court commented that “[a]s far as we know, civil liability is an effective
deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts.”105 Because
“[m]assive deterrence is hardly required” in the context of Hudson, the Court
102
103
104
105

Id. at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597.
Id. at 597–98.
Id. at 598.
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explained, any amount of deterrence from threat of civil liability—in
addition to increased police professionalization—should be sufficient to
protect constitutional rights.106 If exclusion of evidence is a remedy with
social costs that are too substantial to justify its use, then the availability of
civil damages, the Hudson Court intimates, may provide a sufficient
alternative remedy.
As a preliminary problem, the Court does no more than assume that “as
far as we know,” civil remedies for constitutional violations are an adequate
remedy. The Court provides no factual basis for this assumption, which is
itself implicitly based on a premise that when a constitutional violation has
occurred, a remedy should be available. By assuming the adequacy of an
alternative deterrent to unconstitutional practices, the Court makes explicit a
feature of all its social cost reasoning: it is speculative and partial.
The more substantial problem with this assumed alternative, as we shall
see, is that the Court limits the availability of civil damages through a
doctrine of qualified immunity that also calculates the social costs of
inhibiting police practices.107 In this way, the availability of both exclusion
and damages is limited by the social costs the Court claims they impose. In
each case, the social costs the Court uses in its jurisprudential calculations
are limited to the costs imposed on policing, not those incurred by
individuals and communities. In an unacknowledged paradox, therefore, the
Court reasons that the social costs of exclusion are too high in many cases to
provide a remedy for constitutional violations, then “assumes” the
availability and adequacy of alternative civil remedies, which it then
proceeds to limit under its doctrine of qualified immunity based on the same
speculative social cost calculations it uses to deny exclusion of evidence.
In order to obtain civil compensation, a litigant must overcome law
enforcement claims to qualified immunity—a judicially created doctrine
designed to shield police from suit against all but the most egregious
conduct.108 As the Court explained, the general idea motivating the doctrine
is that government officials “performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
106 Id. at 596–97 (“We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence simply
because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago.”).
107 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
108 See, e.g., Joanna Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (2020) (“If
the Court decides to take a closer look at qualified immunity, it will find compelling reasons to greatly
restrict or abolish the defense.”); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of
Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519–24 (2016) (arguing that qualified immunity is a significant
barrier to holding police responsible for acts of violence); see also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity:
Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1887 (2018); Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937 (2018).
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violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”109
Worried that a renewed interest in subjecting government officials to
suit under a provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871110 would unduly
hamper law enforcement officials, the Court sought to limit the availability
of constitutional claims to those that were clearly established in law.111 As
the Court explained, the goal of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive
disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment.”112 Otherwise, society would suffer costs from
more hesitant and constrained law enforcement, the very same costs that the
Court has sought to avoid in limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule.113
As the Court explained in Anderson v. Creighton, these costs can include
“the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation
would unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”114 Qualified
immunity thus serves as a barrier to constitutional remedies because the
Court believes that the enterprise of holding officials to account produces
“social costs . . . that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.’”115

109

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (codifying the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 as amended and authorizing monetary
or injunctive relief against anyone who violates a person’s constitutional rights under color of state law).
111 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (“An officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a
clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official
in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’” (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 778–79 (2014))); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (“The Court of
Appeals should have asked whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from stopping and
taking down a man in these circumstances. Instead, . . . [it] defined the clearly established right at a high
level of generality . . . saying . . . the ‘right to be free of excessive force’ was clearly established.”
(quoting Emmons v. City of Escondido, 716 F. App’x 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2018))); see also District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–93 (2018); John C. Jeffries Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified
Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 854–59 (2010) (describing the problem of generality in assessing
whether the law is clearly established).
112 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
113 See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (explaining that “qualified immunity is
important to ‘society as a whole,’” (quoting City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 n.3
(2015))); see also Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1881 (2018) (“[Q]ualified immunity’s core effectiveness might well not
be in district courts formally utilizing the defense to dispose of Section 1983 lawsuits. Instead, its main
influence could be in discouraging plaintiffs to file Section 1983 lawsuits at all . . . .”); Michael L. Wells,
Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 379,
391 (2018) (“If officers were liable for every constitutional violation, they might hesitate before taking a
step that produces a public benefit because an error would lead to personal liability.”).
114 483 U.S. at 638.
115 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
110
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As a way of avoiding these costs, a litigant asserting constitutional
harms against a law enforcement officer has the burden of navigating a twostep inquiry which the Court solidified in Saucier v. Katz.116 Qualifiedimmunity claims, the Court explained, should be evaluated by first deciding
whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the
injury . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right.”117 If this initial inquiry is satisfied, then a court must ask
“whether the right was clearly established,”118 an inquiry that must focus on
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted” in a specific manner based on prior
case law.119
The facts in Anderson v. Creighton are instructive in the way that
qualified immunity works to deny remedies to those persons who suffer
constitutional harms from police misconduct. Even though police had
entered a family’s residence without a warrant, holding even children at
gunpoint while looking for a relative they thought might be hiding there, the
Court in Anderson found that the circumstances warranted no further inquiry
into whether the officer’s actions violated clearly established law.120 As the
Court explained:
Our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must
have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more
relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.121

Contorting logic, the Court claimed that an officer can reasonably act
unreasonably in misapplying a probable cause and exigent circumstances
standard to falsely believe that their entry into a home complied with the
Constitution. When police reasonably act unreasonably under the relevant
constitutional standard, the Court concluded, it is inappropriate to hold
officers personally liable for their unconstitutional actions.122 In this way, the
116

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Id.; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (describing the two-step inquiry
in Saucier).
118 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
119 Id. at 202.
120 See the facts as found in Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d. 1269, 1270–71 (8th Cir. 1985).
Even though completely innocent, a family was awakened, held at gunpoint, and beaten, and then the
father was arrested for obstruction of an unwarranted home search. Id.
121 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
122 Id. at 643–44 (finding no problem with officers acting “reasonably unreasonable”); Saucier,
533 U.S. at 206 (“Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the
existence of probable cause or exigent circumstances, for example, and in those situations courts will not
hold that they have violated the Constitution.”).
117
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Creightons suffered a constitutional harm from the police invasion of their
home that the Court was unwilling to remedy. No explanation is given why
a harm of this kind—illegal police conduct victimizing innocent citizens—
is not also a cost that society suffers for purposes of a Fourth Amendment
calculus of social cost that would warrant greater judicial concern.
The Saucier two-step process might at least have the virtue of
establishing a body of constitutional law under the first step, even if the
judgment that an officer’s actions in a particular case violated the
Constitution was not clearly established. In this way, a case in which
qualified immunity applies can also serve to develop Fourth Amendment law
by further clarifying when particular actions violate the Constitution.
Viewing the necessary order of this inquiry as too rigid and likely to produce
unnecessary judgments on constitutional questions, the Court in Pearson v.
Callahan concluded that courts do not have to decide whether an officer’s
conduct violates the Constitution if the conduct under consideration had not
been clearly established as unlawful.123 By dismissing a complaint because
the unlawful conduct had not been clearly established with the appropriate
degree of specificity, courts avoid “[u]nnecessary litigation of constitutional
issues,” thereby preserving judicial resources—no matter how egregious the
underlying police conduct in fact was.124
By focusing on whether prior cases have clearly established that an
officer’s conduct was unlawful—not on whether it was in fact unlawful—
this requirement has the potential not only to hinder the development of
Fourth Amendment rules but also to exacerbate the costs society bears from
failing to remedy constitutional violations. These costs occur not only in the
particular case dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity, but in the
future incidence of similar unlawful conduct that has not been adjudicated as
violating the Constitution.125 Because a qualified-immunity inquiry is fact123

555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009).
Id. at 236–37. This approach has been criticized by many, as we shall see below, including lower
court judges. See, e.g., Ventura v. Rutledge, 398 F. Supp. 3d 682, 698 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]his judge
joins with those who have endorsed a complete re-examination of the doctrine which, as it is currently
applied, mandates illogical, unjust, and puzzling results in many cases.”); Nelson v. City of Albuquerque,
283 F. Supp. 3d, 1048, 1108 n.44 (D.N.M. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has crafted their recent qualified
immunity jurisprudence to effectively eliminate § 1983 claims by requiring an indistinguishable case and
by encouraging courts to go straight to the clearly established prong.”).
125 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 37 (2015) (showing evidence that courts reach the constitutional question in qualified-immunity cases
less frequently and decide constitutional questions less frequently overall); see also Zadeh v. Robinson,
928 F.3d 457, 479–80 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., dissenting). Because qualified immunity is such a
daunting barrier for holding police accountable for their unconstitutional actions, structural reform
through other means is also needed. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
124
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dependent and case-specific, the Court admonished in Kisela v. Hughes that
“police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent
‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.”126 Being squarely governed by
law means that although “this Court’s caselaw does not require a case
directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”127
It is unclear what “beyond debate” means other than finding a case
nearly identical, particularly when it comes to the Fourth Amendment
standards applicable to use of deadly force.128 In these cases, the Court
warned “that ‘[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the
relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual
situation the officer confronts,’”129 and therefore liability will only follow if
it “was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
officer’s conduct in the situation [she] confronted.”130 Such a level of fact
dependency, which requires courts to dismiss a case when the unlawfulness
of an officer’s actions was not clearly established in the “situation she
confronted,” provides a legal shield for using force absent gross
incompetence or knowing law violations.131 The Court has long made this
implication clear, explaining that “the qualified immunity defense . . .
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”132
If qualified immunity protects against all law enforcement actions
except those that arise from gross incompetence or willful illegality, the
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“Countering the systemic causes of police misconduct
requires doing more than punishing individual officers. It requires structurally changing police
departments that permit misconduct in order to create accountability for officers and supervisors and
foster norms of professional integrity.”).
126 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015)).
127 Id. at 1152 (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)).
128 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195–98 (2004) (holding that an officer who shot a
suspect in the back while he fled in a vehicle did not violate clearly established law); Kisela, 138 S. Ct.
at 1151, 1153, 1155 (finding that an officer who shot a woman holding a knife near two other people did
not violate clearly established law); White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (holding that an officer who arrived at a
house during ongoing police action to witness shots fired did not violate clearly established standard when
he killed an occupant without warning); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768 (2014) (finding that
firing fifteen shots at a speeding vehicle that has temporarily stopped does not violate clearly
established law).
129 Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)).
130 Id. at 13 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S.
at 199–200).
131 Id. at 12.
132 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified
Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2017) (noting that the Court “appears to be on a mission to curb civil
rights lawsuits against law enforcement officers, and appears to believe qualified immunity is the means
of achieving its goal”).
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doctrine leaves much unconstitutional conduct without a remedy, and thus
also produces widely dispersed social costs.133 Actions taken that are merely
negligent or indifferent to legality will receive protection from a doctrine
invented by the Supreme Court to shield law enforcement from liability.
Despite the existence of a statutory right to seek damages for constitutional
harms produced by official conduct, the qualified-immunity standard places
its thumb on the scale of protecting law enforcement from the very civil
accountability for constitutional violations that the statutory right protects.134
There is no talk of the deterrent value of civil liability. Rather, the focus is
on liability avoidance through litigation avoidance and on enabling police
practice by limiting legal accountability.135
Focused on litigation avoidance, the Court explains that the doctrine of
qualified immunity is motivated by the view that police should be
unencumbered in their actions from excessive fear of future civil liability.136
This logic parallels the Court’s rationale for limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule. Both civil liability and exclusion of evidence, the Court
reasons, should be limited in scope to avoid overdeterring otherwise socially
desirable policing practices.137 Indeed, in developing the standard for
qualified immunity, the Court was explicitly concerned about the costly
effects of exposure to litigation, which comes “at a cost not only to the
defendant officials, but to society as a whole.”138 Moreover, the Court
explained, “These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the

133

See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48 (2018)
(“Recently publicized episodes of police misconduct vividly illustrate the costs of unaccountability.”).
134 Similar results follow from attempting to hold officials accountable for causes of action alleged
directly under the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (refusing to extend Bivens
to allow recovery against a private prison operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of
Prisons); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 (2012) (refusing to provide a constitutional remedy where
state tort remedies are said to be available).
135 A general hostility to litigation has been a primary motivation behind a number of judicial
doctrines, including qualified immunity, especially under the Rehnquist Court. See Andrew M. Siegel,
The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097–98 (2006).
136 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (explaining that qualified immunity’s purpose is to
make sure that “[a] policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with
dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he
does”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(emphasizing “the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform
their duties reasonably”).
137 City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 n.3 (2015).
138 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence”
of officials in the conduct of their duties.139
The Court uses the concept of deterrence in its qualified-immunity
doctrine—as it does in the exclusionary-rule doctrine—but with the opposite
goal. Rather than deterring illegal police conduct as exclusion seeks to do,
the central concern of qualified immunity is to prevent police from being
deterred from energetic policing practices. These divergent goals are in
practice inconsistent considerations with inconsistent logic. Exclusion is
available to deter illegality only if social costs are not too high; otherwise,
civil liability is said to provide the proper remedy. But civil liability risks
deterring policing practices and thereby creating social costs, the Court
reasons, and thus should be made largely unavailable. Through such logic,
the Court’s overriding concern—by limiting both exclusion and civil liability
remedies—seems to be the possibility of diverting police away from their
law enforcement activities, not with deterring illegal activity. Otherwise,
there would be no reason to require the near-impossible search for a factually
similar holding that purports to “clearly establish” the illegality of the
officer’s conduct.140 In this way, the central focus of qualified immunity is
not to facilitate vindication of constitutional rights, but the avoidance of
“costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery in cases where
the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violated were not clearly
established at the time.”141
D. The Uncalculated Social Costs of Immunity
Absent from qualified immunity’s litigation-avoidance reasoning is
concern for the victims of unconstitutional police actions who need no
evidence excluded and will receive no compensation. In light of this
dynamic, and in light of the circumstances of police use of deadly force in
cases like Donovan Lewis, who was shot at home in bed, or Walter Scott,
who was shot in the back—among too many similar cases—calls for

139

Id.
See Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 607–08 (2021)
(“To find a factually similar case is a challenge on its own—particularly given the unending number of
ways government officials can violate people’s constitutional rights.”); John C. Jeffries Jr., The Liability
Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 256 (2013) (“[T]he search for factually similar
precedent extends qualified immunity beyond any defensible rationale. It is as if the one-bite rule for bad
dogs started over with every change in weather conditions.”).
141 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“The basic thrust of
the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance
of disruptive discovery.’”).
140
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reconsidering the qualified-immunity doctrine have grown louder.142 For
example, in a case in which police tased, kicked, hit, placed in a chokehold,
and then shot an individual in possession of a knife while he was
incapacitated on the ground, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged difficulties
with the qualified-immunity doctrine.143 Recognizing the gravity of the
moment from other police shootings in the summer of 2020, the
panel observed:
Before the ink dried on this opinion, the FBI opened an investigation into yet
another death of a black man at the hands of police, this time George Floyd in
Minneapolis. This has to stop. To award qualified immunity at the summary
judgment stage in this case would signal absolute immunity for fear-based use
of deadly force, which we cannot accept.144

Similarly, a Fifth Circuit judge complained that “[t]o some observers,
qualified immunity smacks of unqualified impunity, letting public officials

142 Christine Chung, Columbus Police Release Body Camera Footage of Fatal Shooting, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/31/us/columbus-police-shooting-donovanlewis.html [https://perma.cc/J4LC-RBJB]; Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott
Shooting, Gets 20-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/
us/michael-slager-sentence-walter-scott.html [https://perma.cc/Z5VD-GW3Z]. See, e.g., Editorial
Board, How the Supreme Court Lets Cops Get Away with Murder, N.Y. TIMES (May
29,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/Minneapolis-police-George-Floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/5PJK-ATDZ] (“As the militarization of police tactics and technology has accelerated in
the past two decades, pleas from liberals and conservatives to narrow the doctrine of qualified
immunity . . . have grown to a crescendo.”); David H. Gans, The Supreme Court Enabled Horrific Police
Violence by Ignoring Constitutional History, SLATE (Jun. 3, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/06/supreme-court-enabled-george-floyd-murder-police-violence.html [https://perma.cc/
8AG7-ARM9] (“[Q]ualified immunity makes it incredibly difficult to hold police officers accountable
for police brutality . . . which advocates on both the right and the left have decried.”); Eric
Schnurer, Congress Is Going to Have to Repeal Qualified Immunity, ATLANTIC (Jun.
17, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/congress-going-have-repeal-qualifiedimmunity/613123/ [https://perma.cc/XU8C-T9PP] (“[T]he proposed Ending Qualified Immunity Act is
sponsored by not just a long list of liberal Democrats, but also the Republican turned Libertarian Justin
Amash, from Michigan, and, most recently, Representative Tom McClintock, a California Republican.”).
Scholars have been critical of the doctrine too:

Qualified immunity has been attacked as ahistorical; unjustified as a matter of statutory
interpretation; grounded on inaccurate factual assumptions; antithetical to the purposes of official
accountability and of the statute of which it is putatively a part; unadministrable; regularly
misapplied; a hindrance to the development of constitutional law; a basis for strategic
manipulation by judges; and a source of jurisdictional problems.
Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000
(2018). See also Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1797, 1799 (2018) (“[T]he Court could not justify the continued existence of the doctrine in its
current form.”).
143 Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661, 663–64 (4th Cir. 2020).
144 Id. at 673.
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duck consequences for bad behavior—no matter how palpably
unreasonable—as long as they were the first to behave badly.”145
Calls for reconsideration are not confined to the circuit courts, but
include members of the Supreme Court, including Justices Sotomayor and
Thomas, who are not so often aligned.146 Justice Sotomayor, for example,
argued in a recent case involving police use of deadly force that “[b]y
sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders
the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.”147 This criticism implies
that qualified immunity is designed to allow police to act without regard to
constitutional rights, secure in the knowledge that in only a very few
perfectly delineated situations will their actions be covered by a doctrine that
emphasizes the degree to which rights must be clearly established in advance
by factually similar cases.148 The possibility that Fourth Amendment
protections become hollow, as Justice Sotomayor suggests, is a risk entirely
of the Court’s own making. The doctrine of qualified immunity is a barrier
both to the Court’s role in protecting constitutional rights and to developing
Fourth Amendment rights in relation to policing practice.149

145 Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., dissenting). Judge Willett
further elaborated:

Merely proving a constitutional deprivation doesn’t cut it; plaintiffs must cite functionally
identical precedent that places the legal question “beyond debate” to “every” reasonable officer.
Put differently, it’s immaterial that someone acts unconstitutionally if no prior case held such
misconduct unlawful. This current “yes harm, no foul” imbalance leaves victims violated but not
vindicated. Wrongs are not righted, and wrongdoers are not reproached.
Id. Moreover, he commented on the fact that lower courts need never decide on the constitutionality of
police actions if there is no clear precedent. Thus: “No precedent = no clearly established law = no
liability. An Escherian Stairwell. Heads government wins, tails plaintiff loses.” Id. at 479–80.
146 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that granting
qualified immunity in this case “tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public
that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished”). Similarly, Justice Thomas has recently signaled
his desire to revisit the doctrine in a case in which the Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity to police
officers who deliberately let a dog loose to bite a burglary suspect as a means of apprehending him. Baxter
v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862, 1865 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I continue to have strong doubts
about our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine.”). Although Justice Thomas’s grounds for reconsideration
rely on his commitment to an originalist methodology, the consequence is to join with others in criticizing
the doctrine. See also Baude, supra note 133, at 57 (discussing how the Court originally “rejected the
application of a good-faith defense” to § 1983 claims).
147 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
148 See Jeffries Jr., supra note 111, at 854–59.
149 Indeed, as one commentator makes clear, “The Justices can end qualified immunity in a single
decision, and they should end it now.” Schwartz, supra note 142, at 1800; see also Michelman, supra
note 142, at 2002 (“[T]he legal principles of the doctrine have eroded (or most accurately are in regular
flux); the factual premises underlying the doctrine have been undermined; it has proven unworkable; and
it anchors no reliance interest that the Court should recognize as legitimate.”).
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Not only is there growing criticism that qualified immunity offers a
green light to unlawful police conduct, there is also good evidence that it
fails to fulfill its central purpose of shielding police from litigation.150 To the
extent that it shields officers from liability in all but the most egregious and
incompetent cases, in pursuit of goods like energetic policing said to be
shared by society at large,151 the doctrine also imposes social costs both on
those who are victims of police illegality and those who must live in
apprehension of the potential for police illegality. These are costs that the
Court does not recognize even though it is very much concerned about the
cost to society of diverting the attention and energy of police into litigation
that inhibits the fulfillment of their law enforcement duties.152 Such a cost
calculation does not even purport to capture the costs already borne by those
subjected to illegality that is not clearly established. It is instead focused on
the inchoate costs that might occur were police practices to experience
the purported chilling effect that increased exposure to civil liability
might occasion.153
The costs to the Creighton family, for example, are real and vested. The
Creightons’ home was in fact unconstitutionally invaded by police, and they
were subjected to fear and abuse as the police unconstitutionally detained
them. The inchoate costs to policing practices, by contrast, are products of
the Court’s imagination. The possible future social costs of holding police
accountable for their unconstitutional actions are entirely speculative. In this
way, like the parallel development of the exclusionary rule, the Court
purports to minimize the social costs of underpolicing by imposing
unacknowledged and uncalculated social costs of illegal policing on innocent
citizens and communities who suffer concrete constitutional harms. These
unrecognized harms also reflexively reformulate the meanings of Fourth
Amendment rights.154
150 See Schwartz, supra note 132, at 2 (reviewing over one thousand § 1983 cases in five court
districts and finding “that qualified immunity rarely served its intended role as a shield from discovery
and trial”).
151 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Moreover, there is evidence that the assumption
undergirding qualified immunity that police are trained in “clearly established law” is erroneous. See
Schwartz, supra note 140, at 618–22.
152 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
153
Federalism considerations are implicated as well. See generally Katherine Mims Crocker,
Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1405 (2019) (discussing how
qualified immunity addresses some concerns related to federalism but noting that this “does not justify
the current qualified-immunity regime”).
154 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (2010) (arguing that differential remedial tests
“effectively redraw the contours of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, creating dissonant
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Citizens are caught in a paradox. The Court minimizes the availability
of the exclusionary rule in cases like Hudson and offers civil liability as an
alternative, yet it elsewhere makes clear its hostility to damages liability for
constitutional violations for which the Court does not—or cannot—exclude
evidence. The Court’s doctrines make clear that both the imposition of the
exclusionary rule and a finding of civil liability produce what it considers
substantial social costs. The Court claims civil remedies are the alternative
when social costs are too high to exclude illegally obtained evidence. But
because the Court views the social costs of civil liability to be also high, no
remedy at all is available. Any attempt to vindicate constitutional rights, the
Court instructs, imposes social costs by overdeterring beneficial police
practices. But all violations of constitutional rights can also impose
widespread social costs.155 In the name of avoiding the social costs of
excluding evidence that would set a criminal suspect free, the Court imposes
widespread social costs through illegal police conduct entitled to qualified
immunity. The Court’s doctrines paradoxically impose the high social costs
they claim to avoid.
But what is the total value of all these uncompensated constitutional
harms? The Court cannot say because it does not inquire. To understand this
dynamic better, it is important to recognize how the Court maintains a
distinctive perspective on Fourth Amendment values.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVES
AS THE PRECONDITION FOR SOCIAL COST CALCULATIONS
If, as the Court explained, exclusion “has always been our last resort,
not our first impulse,”156 the obvious question is: what is the first impulse?
One answer suggested by the Court is to adopt the perspective of police. A
pervasive way of thinking about Fourth Amendment rights is that they serve

regulatory signals to criminal justice actors and private individuals seeking to understand constitutional
constraints on law enforcement”).
155 See infra Section III.A; see also Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 294 (1995) (“Where Congress has failed to provide adequate
remedies, or any remedies at all, against unconstitutional actions by the political branches, the courts must
step in and ensure that such remedies exist.”); John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89–90 (1999) (“In constitutional torts, the right-remedy gap is
huge, and the societal loss in underenforced constitutional norms is correspondingly great.”). But see
Richard H. Fallon Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 939 (2019)
(“Decisions involving how to define constitutional rights, which causes of action to authorize, and which
immunity doctrines to create should all reflect a kind of interest-balancing, aimed at yielding the best
overall package.”).
156 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
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to provide administrable codes of conduct for police.157 For example, the
Court explained that “Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by
the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their dayto-day activities.”158 Reasonableness has long been the Fourth Amendment’s
purported “touchstone,” but who is the reasonable person whose perspective
gives that touchstone meaning?159 The police officer. Indeed, the Court often
takes the perspective of police as the starting point of constitutional analysis.
When faced with a proposal for a constitutional rule more responsive to
individual cases, the Court explained that it must “strike a reasonable Fourth
Amendment balance” that “credit[s] the government’s side with an essential
interest in readily administrable rules,”160 which police officers can easily
implement.
Focusing on the ease of administering constitutional rules by the very
institution those rules are meant to regulate is an odd approach to protecting
constitutional rights. The more the Court shapes doctrine by a principle of
administrable ease, the less the broader problem of social cost will be readily
apparent. This Section is primarily diagnostic, with the goal of uncovering
in both judicial practice and in scholarly theory how much the default Fourth
Amendment approach relies on prioritizing policing perspectives, which in
turn shapes the social costs that are visible and therefore applicable to the
problem of calculating total social cost. The reason why the Court focuses
on the social costs of interfering with policing is that Fourth Amendment
doctrine has been shaped to facilitate policing practice, not to enhance
protections for constitutional rights. In order to shift the analysis towards
calculating the total social cost, the Court must shift its perspective.

See Dan-Cohen, supra note 22, at 650 (explaining how certain laws can be construed as “decision
rules” governing police conduct); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699,
1702 (2005) (“In often minute detail, criminal procedure law regulates how and when the police can
conduct searches, seizures, and interrogations.”).
158 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case
Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127,
141 (1974)).
159 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (“But if the test of ‘clearly
established law’ were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the
‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of Harlow.”); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 108–09 (1977) (“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal
security.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))).
160 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
157
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A. Facilitating Policing Practice
When focused on the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement
in light of police use of force, the Court explained that the “calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”161 These and related statements by
the Court mean that a central purpose of the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is not only to regulate police practice, but also to facilitate it
by easing the administration of any constraints Fourth Amendment rights
might impose.162
A debate between the majority and the dissent in Arizona v. Gant is
further illustrative of this central purpose. In deciding that police may not
search the interior of an automobile incident to the arrest of a person who
was a recent occupant, the majority worried that “[c]ountless individuals
guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their
constitutional right to the security of their private effects violated as a
result.”163 In dissent, Justice Alito complained that police should be able to
search the contents of an automobile even if the search was unrelated to the
crime of arrest (such as a traffic violation), arguing that “the rule was adopted
for the express purpose of providing a test that would be relatively easy for
police officers and judges to apply.”164
Elsewhere, the Court explains that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
serves law enforcement interests by protecting officer safety and preserving
evidence—both of which are reasonable grounds for invading privacy.165 As
the Court explained in Thornton v. United States, the “need for a clear rule,
readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing
estimates”166 of factual circumstances justifies an approach to the searchincident rule that can include circumstances that may strain the initial

161 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). The Court also claimed that another proposed
rule that would have limited police ability to enter homes without a warrant “would create unacceptable
and unwarranted difficulties for law enforcement officers who must make quick decisions in the field.”
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011).
162 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014) (acknowledging the Court’s typical role
in providing police with “workable rules” under the Fourth Amendment); see also Dan M. Kahan & Tracy
L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1998) (“[T]he
doctrines that regulate police conduct . . . [constitute] the ‘modern regime of criminal procedure.’”).
163 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009).
164 Id. at 360 (Alito, J., dissenting).
165 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615,
623 (2004).
166 541 U.S. at 622–23.
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rationale.167 In other words, the doctrine favors simple overbreadth to a more
nuanced precision.
In other cases, the Court goes so far in its concern for police
administrability as to limit rights-protective rules in favor of applying broad
exceptions to them in a way that turns the exception into its own policefacilitative rule. Ordinarily, police must have a warrant to enter a home and
conduct a search.168 In Kentucky v. King, Justice Alito explained by contrast
that “a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to
prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the
exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established
exception to the warrant requirement.”169 When exceptions facilitate police
practice, according to Justice Alito, the privacy-protective constitutional rule
is what needs to be limited in order to allow for the expansion of
the exception.
Such a facilitative approach expands the opportunities for police to
enter a dwelling without knocking and announcing and without a warrant—
the implication of King, which authorizes warrantless entry into a home
when police fear imminent destruction of evidence.170 According to this
inverted logic, only when no exigency exists that would allow the King
exception to govern are households protected by the “bright” line rule that
“the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’”171
Thus, either by expanding the scope of doctrines such as public exposure or
search-incident-to-arrest, or by enhancing the application of exceptions to
rights-protective rules, the Court employs multiple police-facilitative
strategies to limit the purported social costs of enforcing constitutional
rights.
Apart from the limits Gant imposes on the search incident doctrine
when it applies to recent occupants of automobiles, the Court regularly
adheres to a Fourth Amendment perspective focused on the needs of police.
For example, recall that a principal concern with qualified immunity is “the

167 In Thornton, for example, the Court applied the rule to an arrestee who had already exited a
vehicle prior to the arrest and search and who was safely confined to the police vehicle. Id. at 618.
168 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Plamondon, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (stressing “the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”); see also Thomas P. Crocker,
The Fourth Amendment at Home, 96 IND. L.J. 167, 168–69 (2020) (explaining that the home is particularly
protected by the Fourth Amendment).
169 563 U.S. 452, 461–62 (2011).
170 Id. at 460.
171 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980)).
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need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority”172—not the need to protect individual citizens from
unconstitutional police conduct. The explicit goal of the doctrine is to
“protect officials” against legal liability for their negligent—albeit not quite
reckless—failure to adhere to constitutional rules. The Court’s rationale
focuses on how greater exposure to possible liability might impact police
practice, not how it affects individuals and communities. But there are limits
to facilitating police practice. The Court has sometimes recognized the social
costs to society through the intrusions on privacy as a way of limiting the
mechanical application of doctrines, as they did in Gant. But the privacy
costs suffered by persons subject to searches are always calculated in
relation to the countervailing needs of police where these needs have a
doctrinal priority.
For example, when establishing a limit to the mechanical application of
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine that would have allowed police to
search the contents of an arrestee’s smartphone, the Court in Riley v.
California began from the premise that “our general preference [is] to
provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules,”
reached by balancing the interests of law enforcement against the intrusions
on privacy.173 Despite the emphasis on providing police with “workable
rules,” Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the privacy interests were too
great given the large amount of content available on the
typical smartphone.174
In contrast to prior cases that allowed searches incident to arrest of a
person’s physical possessions, including containers such as the crumpled
cigarette pack in United States v. Robinson,175 the Court reasoned that
“[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond
those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”176 A
172 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
506 (1978)).
173 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014). The Court explained that “we generally determine whether to exempt
a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Id. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)).
174 Id. at 393–97. Regarding workable rules, the Court explained that “if police are to have workable
rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical basis—not
in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.’” Id. at 398 (quoting Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)).
175 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that police may search the contents of a crumpled
cigarette package).
176 Riley, 573 U.S. at 386, 393.
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person would have to carry around “every piece of mail they have
received . . . every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have
read”177 to match the physical equivalent of the information contained on a
typical smartphone. As the Court explained, “A phone not only contains in
digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also
contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form—unless the phone is.”178 Because of the degree of intrusion, the Court
concluded that police would have to obtain a warrant in order to search the
contents of a person’s smartphone.
The Riley Court admonished that “[p]rivacy comes at a cost,” and
acknowledged the inconvenience that this privacy-protective holding
imposed on police.179 From a police-facilitative perspective, society suffers a
cost when the Court upholds privacy by denying police access to the content
of a smartphone under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine—itself an
exception to the warrant requirement. From a rights-protective perspective,
by contrast, when police invade individual privacy, society suffers a cost
measured by the loss of security in a right to be free from unreasonable
searches.180 Even from a police-facilitative approach, however, some losses
of privacy are too great to ignore, considering the amount of information that
would be available to police from searching a person’s smartphone. Had the
Riley Court expanded the search-incident doctrine, police would have
incentive to make arrests for relatively trivial offenses to enable more
sweeping smartphone searches, which would produce substantial social
costs, not only for the loss of privacy, but for the loss of trust in police that
could follow. Even without the extra incentive, legal arrests themselves can
produce social harms.181
Take, for example, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, in which the Court
held that it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for police to make
arrests for minor offenses even when no jail time was authorized from a
successful conviction.182 Despite recognizing the “pointless indignity” and
“gratuitous humiliations” wrought by “a police officer who was (at best)
exercising extremely poor judgment” in arresting Ms. Atwater for a minor
seatbelt violation, the Court did not contemplate the costs society might
177

Id. at 393–94.
Id. at 396–97.
179 Id. at 401.
180 See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 131 (2008) (exploring how the
Fourth Amendment protects the “people’s right of security”).
181 These harms are especially apparent when arrests are conducted without justification, even when
the police have the law on their side. See Harmon, Why Arrest?, supra note 16, at 313–20 (analyzing the
many uncalculated costs of arrests to individuals, their families, and their communities).
182 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
178
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suffer from police engaging in more widespread practices of minor-offense
arrests.183 Making such gratuitous arrests would have been all the more
profitable for police had Riley been decided in California’s favor. Police
would have been empowered to make arrests for minor offenses as a pretext
to more sweeping searches of electronic devices under a search incident
doctrine, producing widespread social costs.184
These putative costs, however, differ from those incurred from the
underenforcement of the exclusionary rule or of civil liability. These costs
would derive from calculating the loss of privacy from a less privacyprotective Fourth Amendment rule than the Court in fact imposes. This
possibility is a reminder that the social cost of privacy intrusions can occur
both through violation of constitutional rules and through compliance with
more police-facilitative constitutional rules. The nature of the cost changes
from actual harms to opportunity costs from lost privacy. These costs include
intrusions on the freedom of movement, exposure to additional searches, and
loss of trust in the legitimacy of law enforcement motives and practices,
among others.
Underlying the Court’s claim that “privacy comes at a cost,” moreover,
is a default view that constitutional standards must be “sufficiently clear and
simple”185 to “provide clear guidance to law enforcement”186 because the
government has “an essential interest in readily administrable rules.”187 In
this way, privacy comes at a cognizable cost only if the underlying priority
of Fourth Amendment doctrine is to facilitate police practice rather than to
protect a constitutional right. Otherwise, a calculation of the social cost of
constitutional criminal procedures should measure the cost of lost privacy,
not the cost of its protection.
In keeping with the structure of rights protections, the cost calculation
related to privacy should focus on its intrusion into the personal lives of
individuals by widespread policing practices the Fourth Amendment is
empowered to prevent. Cost considerations from a rights perspective bring
into view questions of police legitimacy or the need for more effective means

183 Id. at 346–47; see also Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1002 (2014) (noting that the
Court’s “exclusive object of analysis” was the act of arrest rather than its context or motivation).
184 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (allowing stops and arrests under
pretext unless “conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy or
even physical interests”).
185 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
186 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 398 (2014).
187 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
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of internalizing constitutional norms in policing practice.188 To emphasize
easily administrable rules obviates the need for law enforcement officials to
internalize constitutional norms rather than think in instrumental terms. Such
instrumentality reflexively alters the meaning of Fourth Amendment rights
now understood through the lens of a more limited exclusionary remedy.
Facilitating policing practice through ease of administrable regulations
is an odd way to construe the purpose of a constitutional right otherwise
designed to limit the power of law enforcement officials to conduct searches
and make arrests.189 Rights ordinarily serve to protect persons from official
interference with their liberties and to provide structural checks on the power
of the state—not to empower government practice through easy application
of the doctrinal rules that implement the rights.190 If the Court’s goal in
construing the Fourth Amendment is to empower police through
straightforward regulations, then it follows that social cost analysis will
focus on factors such as overdeterring police practices and underprosecuting
civilian lawbreakers. When it focuses on these and other such factors, the
Court is actively and affirmatively choosing to view the matter from the
police perspective.
It bears emphasizing that this choice could be otherwise. The preceding
discussion illustrates that social costs occur no matter which constitutional
rules have priority, so the question shifts to how to assess which costs and
which harms to avoid. Cost avoidance is in part a matter of calculation—
adding up the degree and kind of harms that follow from particular rules. But
cost avoidance is also a normative matter dependent upon the values the
Court chooses to prioritize by the perspectives it takes. As the next Section
explores, when the Court takes the police perspective, that normative choice
has tremendous implications for the Fourth Amendment’s cost calculus.

188 See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 21, at 58–59 (exploring the relation between
willingness to obey the law and the perception of law enforcement legitimacy); Tyler, Legitimacy, supra
note 21, at, 315–16; see also Schulhofer et al., supra note 21, at 350–51 (finding that intensive law
enforcement “weaken[s] police legitimacy, and undermine[s] voluntary compliance”).
189 Because of the dynamic of citizen–police encounters, and because of the state’s role in criminal
law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment’s regulatory role in guiding police is unavoidable. See
Amsterdam, supra note 50, at 377–80. Whether and to what extent it imposes duties or provides
protections to citizens or police is a different matter of distribution and perspective. See, e.g., Reich, supra
note 31, at 1161–62 (describing a series of demeaning police encounters).
190 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 147 (“Our constitutional system rests on a particular moral
theory, namely, that [individuals] have moral rights against the state.”); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 61 (1997) (suggesting that “[t]he
indispensable function of constitutional doctrine . . . is to implement the Constitution,” which establishes
rights and structure).
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B. Seeing Through the Police Officer’s Eyes
In Scott v. Harris, the Court quite literally took the perspective of law
enforcement when it held that no reasonable jury could find that police acted
unreasonably.191 When the car Victor Harris was driving was observed
travelling eighteen miles per hour over the speed limit on a Georgia highway,
a deputy sheriff attempted a routine traffic stop. But Harris did not stop,
leading to a high-speed chase that ended when Officer Scott rammed Harris’s
car with his police vehicle, causing a serious accident that rendered Harris a
quadriplegic. Harris sued claiming that Scott’s actions were an unjustified
use of deadly force against a speeding motorist.192 Under a qualifiedimmunity standard, the Eleventh Circuit had agreed with the lower court that
there were issues to be tried before a jury concerning the reasonableness of
the officer’s actions in the situation.193 The Supreme Court reversed, noting
that a video recording of the chase provided an “added wrinkle in this case,”
and that “[t]he videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story
told by the respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”194
Appending the police-cruiser video of the chase to the opinion, the
Court proclaimed, “We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for
itself.”195 The viewer is invited to see the case from the perspective of the
police giving chase, the very perspective the Court adopted, even though
judges at both lower courts had seen things differently.196 Justice Scalia wrote
that “what we see on the video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style
car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent
bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.”197 Because the police
perspective was so overwhelming to Justices on the Supreme Court, it was
inconceivable that they could adopt the perspective of the recalcitrant driver
whose “version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no
reasonable jury could have believed him.”198 Although lower court judges as
well as Justice Stevens saw alternative perspectives, the Court proclaimed

191

550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
Id. at 374–75.
193
Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 807, 821 (11th Cir. 2005).
194 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
195 Id. at 378 n.5.
196 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 815–16 (“[Respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for
turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the
road. Nor was he a threat to pedestrians . . . .” (citations omitted)).
197 Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
198 Id.
192
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that “[t]he videotape tells quite a different story.”199 In this way, subsequent
analysis of the reasonableness of the deputy sheriff’s actions seems to be less
a matter of judgment about disputed facts than a deduction from axiomatic
premises that the video was said to make certain.
Purporting to weigh the costs of both possible actions—requiring police
to let the driver continue unharmed to be arrested later or allowing them to
use deadly force—the Court claimed that it was the driver “who intentionally
placed himself and the public in danger,”200 a view that stops just short of
saying that he has “only [himself] to blame”201 for his injuries. Again,
adopting the clarity of the video evidence from the police perspective as the
basis for its judgment, the Court explained:
Although there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear
from the videotape that respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the
lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase. 202

In a choice between different forms of disorder—allowing the lawbreaker to
go temporarily free or using deadly force—the Court adopted the perspective
of the police and invited the viewer to do the same. In doing so, the Court
also adopted an approach to the standard governing use of force in which “all
that matters is whether [the officer’s] actions were reasonable,” where
reasonableness is determined not from an objective perspective of events,
but from the police perspective alone.203
The choice of framing supports a particular weighing of social costs.
On the Court’s measurement, the general threat the fleeing car posed to the
public produced greater social cost than did the specific harm (or potential

199

Id. at 379. The Court went on to explain:

There we see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at
speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the
double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to
avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in the
occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in the same
hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.
Id. at 379–80.
200 Id. at 384.
201 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011).
202 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–84.
203 Id. at 383. In this way too, the Court did not apply the standard applicable to deadly force from
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (“[S]uch [deadly] force may not be used unless it is necessary
to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”). See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police
Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1133–40 (2008) (discussing the relation between Garner
and Scott).
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death) that Officer Scott’s actions imposed on Harris.204 Moreover, as the
Court explained, police acted to protect innocent bystanders from Harris’s
reckless actions, making “it appropriate in this process to take into account
not only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability.”205 In
choosing to facilitate deadly force, the Court considered only the specific
harm that might befall a specific individual, ignoring the possibility that a
more permissive approach might have significant social ramifications.
The actual story in Scott is far more complex than a single perspective,
suggesting that the Court’s objective was not to invite consensus on the
Hollywood-style reading we should all adopt when viewing the video but to
construct a normative case for looking at the video from the perspective of
the police. Empirical evidence, not to mention the views of the lower courts
as well as the dissenting Justice Stevens, implies that the video does not
“speak for itself” to show the reasonableness of the police action in this
case.206 Seeing is filtered through cultural frames, expectations, and the
limited optical view of the camera.207 Curiously, if the video evidence speaks
for itself, it does so according to the Court through the frame of fictional
Hollywood portrayals, requiring the viewer to see the film within a particular
genre.208 But to say that the viewer has to place the film within a fictional
genre to best understand what it “most closely resembles” belies the claim
that it speaks for itself.209 It must be mediated. Fictional framing reinforces
the police-perspective framing, inviting the viewer to place the events within

204

Scott, 550 U.S. at 379 n.6 (stating that in comparison to high-speed emergency vehicles, society
“need not (and assuredly does not) accept a similar risk posed by a reckless motorist fleeing the police”).
The Court also characterized respondent’s actions as an “extreme danger to human life.” Id. at 383.
205 Id. at 384.
206 See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 864–79 (2009);
Naomi Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual Literacy,
48 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2013) (“[C]ourts and legal actors lack a critical vocabulary of the visual, and
without visual literacy, they are more likely to be unduly credulous in the face of images.”).
207 On cultural framing as a form of cognitive bias, see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald
Braman, Danieli Evans & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 883–85 (2012).
208 See Peter Brooks, Scott v. Harris: The Supreme Court’s Reality Effect, 29 LAW & LITERATURE
143, 147–48 (2017). For a review of case law on the use and admissibility of film as evidence, see Jessica
M. Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493,
501–02 (2004). See also Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The
Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 182 (2008) (discussing the problems with the Court
treating the Scott video evidence as “truthful, unbiased, objective, and unambiguous”).
209 See Howard M. Wasserman, Police Misconduct, Video Recording, and Procedural Barriers to
Rights Enforcement, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1313, 1321–30 (2018) (“The Scott Court fundamentally
misunderstood video and video evidence. Video does not possess a singular meaning or tell a singular
story to all viewers . . . .”).
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a cops-and-robbers dynamic in which the police inevitably prevail.210
Notably, the Court does not attempt or invite consideration of the events
from the point of view of Harris.211
Such framing is normative as well. By arguing that the video speaks for
itself, that it utterly discredits other perspectives, and that it makes clear the
public dangers Harris posed, the Court presents the police perspective as the
only proper one through which to view the events. In this way, for the video
to speak for itself is for the video to speak from the perspective of police on
behalf of a particular weighing of social costs. This choice of framing is not
neutral. It affects outcomes.212 Nonetheless, it is consistent with the Court’s
overall orientation to Fourth Amendment rights as facilitating police practice
from the perspective of law enforcement interests.
Reform attempts to make policing more visible, and thereby more
accountable, through implementation of body-worn cameras confronts
similar framing problems.213 With the use of the dashboard camera in Scott,
one approach is to think that more of such video evidence will be of use to
judicial proceedings and public accountability. One issue that recurs with the
many occasions in which police use deadly force is the lack of video
evidence of events that would be available for official review or for public
reassurance.214 In an attempt to make police feel that their actions are subject
to monitoring, some advocate the use of body-worn cameras as a way of
providing video evidence of police practice that would facilitate
accountability.215 If police had worn cameras in Ferguson, Missouri when
210 On the importance of framing, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCH. 341, 343–44 (1984); and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981).
211 See Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333,
1360–63 (2010).
212 See id. at 1347–51; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 210, at 343–44; Kahan et al., supra note
206, at 883–87 (discussing how groups’ different understandings of background social reality frame their
understanding of the facts of the case and their viewing of the video).
213 See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 897, 921–26 (2017) (discussing the convergence of interest groups advocating use of police-worn
body cameras); see also Department of Justice Awards over $20 Million to Law Enforcement Body-Worn
Camera Programs, DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justiceawards-over-20-million-law-enforcement-body-worn-camera-programs [https://perma.cc/7279-RLYQ].
214
See Wasserman, supra note 209, at 1358–62. The Washington Post compiles data on police
shootings across the country. Police Shootings Database 2015–2022, WASH. POST (June 29, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/
[https://perma.cc/WLZ9-Z57Z].
215 See Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos,
96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2018); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV.
1363, 1422 (2018) (considering potential symbolic, behavioral, and informational benefits); Stephen E.
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they shot Michael Brown, advocates lament, the public would have a better
picture of events to assess Officer Wilson’s claim to have acted in selfdefense.216 Critics of body-worn cameras, by contrast, argue that they are not
a panacea. The critics focus on the limited reliability of the camera in fastmoving circumstances, its manipulability by police, and the difficulties of
gaining public access to footage, among other problems.217
Without wading into the thick of this controversy, note that like the
dashboard camera in Scott, the video evidence will always come from the
perspective of police. Ironically, the very mechanism that might provide a
basis for accountability and reform itself risks reinforcing the policing
perspective. Video evidence also risks misuse and becomes a further tool
through which government surveillance can invade the privacy of ordinary
citizen activities.218
As a counterweight, the proliferation of third-party video surveillance
of police makes possible alternative perspectives that can provide some
balance to the policing perspective.219 With the widespread availability of
Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say About Police Body Cameras),
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 970 (2016) (“[G]iven the myriad benefits of tamper-resistant, always-on
officer recording . . . it seems such recording is worth the privacy cost . . . [which] means police should
record.”).
216 Fan, supra note 215, at 1653–55; Max Ehrenfreund, Body Cameras for Cops Could Be the Biggest
Change to Come Out of the Ferguson Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014, 8:39 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/02/body-cameras-for-cops-could-be-thebiggest-change-to-come-out-of-the-ferguson-protests/ [https://perma.cc/UR6T-BT67]; German Lopez,
Police Body Cameras, Explained, VOX (Aug. 22, 2016, 3:05 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/
9/17/6113045/police-worn-body-cameras-explained [https://perma.cc/RPF8-TGBM].
217 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Beyond Surveillance: Data Control and Body Cameras, 14 SURVEILLANCE
& SOC’Y 133, 136 (2016) (“[I]n the rush to respond to calls for greater police accountability, many
American police departments lack consistent, clear, or—in some cases—any, formal policies regarding
how to control that data. Without clear limits, body-worn cameras may become just another tool for law
enforcement rather than a mechanism for police accountability.”); Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras:
Exploring the Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for
Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 988 (2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral
Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 833 (2015) (“While body cameras are a good idea
and police departments should be encouraged and supported in using them, it is nevertheless important
not to see them as a magic bullet. The public discussion needs less absolute rhetoric and more open
recognition of the limitations of this technology.”); Robinson Meyer, Body Cameras Are Betraying Their
Promise, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/bodycameras-are-just-making-police-departments-more-powerful/502421 [https://perma.cc/K3D4-M6MA];
Louise Matsakis, Body Cameras Haven’t Stopped Police Brutality. Here’s Why, WIRED (June
17, 2020, 12:41 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/body-cameras-stopped-police-brutality-george-floyd
[https://perma.cc/LV5F-LVAG].
218 See Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on Police Accountability
vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 889 (2015).
219 See Fan, supra note 215, at 1642–43 (“[P]eople and the police are recording each other from all
directions, making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 407 (2016).
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technology through smartphones to record publicly observed activity, any
person can become a videographer of police conduct. Without citizen
surveillance, to cite only one example of too many, the public would not
have the horrifying evidence of the police conduct that led to George Floyd’s
death.220 In this way, third-party surveillance and the proliferation of
perspectives provides one possible way that citizens can become the
surveillants.221 The availability of multiple perspectives, however, can only
be an episodic and contingent addition to the increasingly regularized use of
police-worn cameras. Through the use of body-worn cameras, the policing
perspective risks remaining dominant, even if at times contestable from
alternative perspectives on the same events.
Privileging the police perspective pervades the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In this respect, using the dashboard camera or
the body-worn camera allows the policing perspective to “speak for itself”
within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court already sees its primary
task as facilitating policing practice through conduct rules that leave some
constitutional harms without a remedy, as we have seen. The body-worn
camera establishes expectations based on perspective that will further
facilitate the Court’s jurisprudential orientation.
When crafting Fourth Amendment rules that govern citizen–police
encounters, the choice of perspective matters for the ability of citizens to
vindicate their rights. Citizens must often navigate complex interactions with
police subject to constitutional rules designed from the police perspective,
not from that of citizens who seek to invoke their Fourth Amendment rights.
Apart from any video record, citizens must confront police in a variety of
unfamiliar circumstances that make it difficult to know what their
constitutional rights are, especially in situations when police seek consent to
conduct a search or ask questions. From the citizen’s perspective, the
nuances of Fourth Amendment doctrine will be unknown in attempting to
determine whether an officer’s request is really a polite command (“may I
see your license and registration please” during a traffic stop) or a genuine
request which the citizen may refuse (“may I look around inside your car”
when otherwise lacking Fourth Amendment grounds to do so).222 The lack of
220 See Audra D.S. Burch & John Eligon, Bystander Videos of George Floyd and Others Are Policing
the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/george-floydminneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/75F9-FAHW].
221 See Fan, supra note 215, at 1643.
222 See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP.
CT. REV. 153, 155 (reviewing empirical studies showing that “the extent to which people feel free to
refuse [an officer’s request] to comply is extremely limited under situationally induced pressures”); see
also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“So long as a reasonable person would feel free ‘to
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clarity from the citizen perspective is an advantage for police, who can
exploit their position of authority to obtain consent to search where they
would otherwise fail to meet the relevant Fourth Amendment standard of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
With this asymmetry in mind, the Court could craft rules from the
citizens’ perspective to empower them to vindicate their constitutional
rights. Yet the Court explicitly refuses to do so. Indeed, the Court “has
rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always
inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a
warrantless consent search.”223 In another case, the Court deemed it
“unrealistic” to require state police to inform a motorist that he was free to
leave at the end of a traffic stop that evolved into what the Court judged to
be a consensual encounter.224 Although the precise nature of the encounter
can only be clear from the police officer’s perspective, the Court refused to
require officers to make evident to a citizen what their constitutional rights
are in the situation.225
The combined trends of emphasizing remedial deterrence as the goal of
excluding evidence and attention to the police perspective as the means of
evaluating factual circumstances mean that judges play a diminished role in
supervising police practice through constitutional norms. By encouraging
police to seek consent to engage in searches in situations otherwise governed
by the Fourth Amendment, the Court places more burdens on individuals to
protect their own rights. Unable to discern when a request for a search is
really a polite command or when one is free to decline police requests, or
when one is otherwise free to go about one’s business ignoring police
disregard the police and go about his business,’ the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion
is required.” (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991))).
223 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002); see also Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E.
Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 738 (2000) (“[T]he Court made ‘voluntariness’ a
placeholder for an analysis of the competing interests of order and liberty . . . .”).
224
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (“[S]o too would it be unrealistic to require police
officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed
voluntary.”); see also Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 915 (2009) (criticizing judicial reliance on “common sense” projections of how persons might
feel or respond to particular circumstances, as a Justice’s common sense may differ from that of a member
of the general public).
225 After the police killing of an unarmed teenager in Ferguson, Missouri, the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing recommended precisely what the Supreme Court refuses to require as a matter
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness: “Law enforcement officers should be required to seek consent
before a search and explain that a person has the right to refuse when there is no warrant or probable
cause.” OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE
ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 27 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RB5N-BK7Z].
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overtures, the individual must bear the entire burden of any mistaken
perception of the social situation unsupported by later judicial
determinations. In this way, reliance on new technologies such as body-worn
cameras will not assist citizens in knowing what they are entitled to do when
confronting police, serving to reinforce the policing perspective, not to
protect individual rights.
C. The Equilibrium Equation
If Fourth Amendment rules are adopted in order to advance “the virtue
of providing clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement
profession,”226 then the Court must adjust the guidelines as new technologies
and circumstances arise to which the Fourth Amendment applies. Making
rule adjustments in order to maintain a particular level of policing, one
scholarly view argues, requires a process of “equilibrium adjustment,”
whereby the Court constantly adjusts the relative balance between police
power and personal privacy to maintain a kind of rough original
equilibrium.227 Social developments and technological change disrupt this
Fourth Amendment equilibrium on this view, forcing the Court to alter the
rules to maintain or “restore the prior equilibrium of police power” as a
corrective mechanism.228
This theory both describes and justifies existing doctrine, while also
exemplifying a particular way of thinking about the Fourth Amendment—
from the perspective of police power—that exacerbates the problem of social
cost.229 The normative goal of equilibrium adjustment is “to maintain police

226

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)); see also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682
(1988)) (noting the aim of providing clear guidelines for law enforcement).
227 Kerr, supra note 29, at 487–90. As the equilibrium theory explains, it is the police who must be
granted relaxed standards in order to keep up with social use of technology, not innocent individuals and
communities whose privacy must be protected against police use of such technology. For criticism of
such approaches, see Sklansky, supra note 29, at 235–37 (explaining the alternative “principle of
conservation of privacy” whereby “we strive to maintain a cumulative level of privacy comparable to that
existing at the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted”); Christopher Slobogin, An Original Take on
Originalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 14 (2011) (arguing that the equilibrium-adjustment theory “does not
easily explain many of the Court’s cases, nor does it help address the most difficult Fourth Amendment
issues facing the Court today”); Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1486 (2017); and Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570,
655 (2018) (“[E]quilibrium adjustment is not just indeterminate, but also prone to leading courts astray.”).
228 Kerr, supra note 29, at 487.
229 For mixed support for this approach, see Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without
Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1339–45 (2012); and Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2020) (noting that “such equilibrium adjustment
likely does play a general role in many Fourth Amendment contexts”).
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power in response to changing facts,”230 not to maintain the degree of privacy
necessary for the people to be free from arbitrary government intrusion and
essential to practices of self-government.231 This normative purpose,
however, reinforces the problematic orientation of Fourth Amendment
doctrine as principally focused on facilitating the effective administration of
law enforcement, not on protecting privacy.232
If the goal of equilibrium adjustment is to maintain a status quo
distribution of police power relative to a criminal’s capacity to exploit social
and technological change, then the price of that stability is the accretion of
additional policing power over everyday citizens. This equilibrium fails to
account for the innocent citizens now subject to more requests for consent
searches, greater risk of being stopped and frisked, pervasive surveillance of
their third-party data, inquiries at checkpoints, and many other policing
practices that intrude on everyday life.233 Prior to the development of the
automobile, police had limited means of transportation. Even if police could
have availed themselves of the full investigatory toolkit authorized by the
Gant automobile exception (using pretext to stop a vehicle; question its
occupants; seek consent to engage in a search; and use a flexible probable
cause standard as a basis for searching the vehicle, its inhabitants, and the
contents of their belongings) the equilibrium adjustment would look entirely
different than it does today, when police can rove around a city with ease.234
It is not plausible to think that a policing institution engaged in such activities
in some founding-era original equilibrium. At each stage of technological
progress, the exposure of the public to lower-cost, more-pervasive police

230

Kerr, supra note 29, at 489.
Justice Scalia, by contrast, articulates an originalist claim in terms of privacy, seeking to “assure
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012); see also Sklansky, supra note 29, at 235
(explaining the “principle of conservation of privacy” whereby “we strive to maintain a cumulative level
of privacy comparable to that existing at the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted”).
232 See also Richards, supra note 227, at 1486 (“[A]t a descriptive level, Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory focuses on the power of the state rather than the civil liberties of the people the government is
entrusted with serving.”).
233 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991) (allowing police to search containers in
a car without a warrant based on a probable cause standard); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999) (reiterating that no warrant is required for police to search belongings in a car); Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (stating that police can request consent for searches after a traffic stop citation
is complete without informing detainees that they are free to go).
234 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (first articulating the automobile
exception); Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579 (expanding the automobile exception to include containers in an
automobile); see also Sarah A. Seo, The New Public, 125 YALE L.J. 1616, 1647 (2016) (“By
midcentury . . . the governance of automobility had amounted to more than bureaucratic inconveniences
for drivers. Public rights to the automobile had served as the handmaiden to a new kind of society that
seemed less bound by law and more subject to the whims of police discretion”).
231
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surveillance increases.235 There has been no equilibrium adjustment for the
more dispersed social costs communities incur.
Equilibrium theory represents a particularly salient example of how the
policing perspective pervades not simply the Court’s approach to the Fourth
Amendment but also normative scholarly commentary. Equilibrium theory
turns the Supreme Court into an adjustment bureau whose purpose is to
maintain police power, not to protect constitutional rights nor to consider the
social costs of rules that produce privacy losses in relation to technological
changes. In this way, both practice and theory provide justifications for
adopting the police perspective, which has the effect of employing the Fourth
Amendment to empower police rather than to protect the privacy of “the
People” both as individuals and as political sovereigns.236 This policing
perspective leads the Court to make social cost calculations that fail to
account for actual social cost.
Fourth Amendment rights, therefore, are underinvoked in addition to
being underenforced.237 Their invocation—because of the burden shift
occasioned by the Court’s adoption of a policing perspective—is itself
fraught with risk for the individual who might err, for example, in invoking
a right to ignore. When an individual seeks to hold police to account for
unconstitutional actions through civil suits, the Court likewise, as we have
seen, both underenforces constitutional rights and alters the meaning of those
rights in relation to their everyday application. If the first line of defense for
individual rights is the individual herself—either during the encounter with
police or after the fact—then there will be fewer rights invoked and therefore
more police practices that exceed limits that a rights-protective perspective
might otherwise constrain.
III. THE COST OF COST AVOIDANCE:
ON RECALCULATING FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDIES
What the Court leaves unexplained is: If society has an interest in
avoiding letting lawbreakers go free, why does society not also have an equal
or greater interest in protecting individual privacy and dignity—an interest
that lies at the heart of the constitutional right the Fourth Amendment

235 Professor Jonathan Mayer makes a similar point, arguing that “judicial adoption of equilibrium
adjustment risks a ‘ratchet-up effect’ for warrantless surveillance capabilities. For each new technology
that criminals adopt to conceal evidence, law enforcement can deploy a novel investigative technique that
circumvents the criminal technology without being subject to heightened procedural protections.” Mayer,
supra note 227, at 657.
236 See Crocker, supra note 38, at 354–71.
237 See infra Section III.A.
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protects?238 Moreover, when the Court withholds a remedy for illegal police
conduct, it is committing a judicial act of letting a lawbreaker go free as well.
Why does the Court gesture expansively, albeit imprecisely, at the “heavy
toll” that “society at large” bears when the Court applies the exclusionary
rule,239 but not even acknowledge that society likewise suffers costs, though
in need of suitable articulation, when law enforcement officers act illegally?
Although Mapp v. Ohio first articulated deterrence as one of the values
that the exclusionary rule would support, the Court in later cases like Herring
has treated it as the sole value.240 The Court in Mapp, no doubt, explained
that the exclusionary rule removes an incentive for law enforcement to
conduct searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.241 But the stakes of
official illegality are also systemic and concern fundamental values. “The
ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest.”242
The exclusionary rule does more than just deter: it supports systemic
values of judicial integrity, as the Court explained in Terry v. Ohio, by
preventing courts from being “made party to lawless invasions of the
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use
of the fruits of such invasions.”243 Moreover, the rule encourages “those who
formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them,
to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.”244 By
claiming that the Fourth Amendment protects values that should be
incorporated into the fabric of policing practices as a systemic matter of
constitutional governance, the Court has recognized that any social costs
relevant to imposing the exclusionary rule have to be measured by more than
deterrence effects. Rules designed to avoid social costs have structural
effects on the nature of the constitutional governance Americans will have.
Because social costs occur no matter how the Court conceptualizes the
central Fourth Amendment purpose, and thus the scope of the exclusionary
rule, accountability for wrongdoing—for either form of illegality—will
inevitably be incomplete. To use evidence obtained by illegal conduct allows
official illegality to have effect within the criminal justice system, and to
suppress the evidence allows individual criminality to go unpunished. Either
238 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (recognizing the “inestimable right of personal
security”).
239 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011).
240 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2008).
241 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
242 Id. at 660.
243 392 U.S. at 13; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (holding that the exclusionary rule upholds “the
imperative of judicial integrity” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960))).
244 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
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approach influences practice in light of constitutional meaning while at the
same time reflexively constituting that meaning. Emphasizing deterrence
and instrumental rationality, however, does not account for the social
meaning police illegality has in everyday citizen–police relations and more
broadly its effect on citizen views of governing authority.245 Constitutional
governance does not entail perfect judicial enforcement of protected rights,
leaving gaps between citizen expectations and policing prerogatives. Social
costs are therefore unavoidable. The central question however is how to
calculate these costs—what to include and what to leave as is. The answers
to these questions, as we have seen, depend on the perspectives the Court
adopts in light of the remedial doctrines it creates.
A. Rights Remediation and Constitutional Meaning
An important theoretical issue structures how to think about the
practical problem of the Fourth Amendment’s social cost: how to understand
the relationship between the meaning of the right and the availability of a
remedy. Perfect remedial enforcement might be neither desirable nor
possible, but imperfect enforcement can also produce substantial social
costs. To acknowledge that there are underenforced constitutional rights is
not simply to make a claim about rights essentialism.246 No doubt, on a more
robust view of Fourth Amendment rights, the Court’s approach in qualifiedimmunity and exclusionary-rule cases leaves constitutional rights violations
without a remedy and therefore underenforces the Constitution.247 But to
acknowledge this dynamic need not commit one to claiming that the rights–
remedy gap is entirely the work of some conception of a “platonic ideal” of

245 See generally Tyler, supra note 37 (discussing the role of the fairness of legal processes in
molding public behavior); Delgado, supra note 37 (noting that a loss of faith in the fairness of legal
processes has shaped public behavior towards law enforcement); see also Tom R. Tyler, Stephen
Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of
Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 369–71 (2010) (asserting that “deterrence and legitimacy
[are] rival explanations for cooperation with the police”).
246 One approach to the rights–remedy gap is to begin with a conception of the right formed
independently of its practical implementation or remedial possibilities—what Levinson calls “rights
essentialism.” See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 870–72, 924–25 (1999); Jeffries, supra note 155, at 112–13.
247 See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (explaining how institutional concerns can leave
constitutional rights underenforced); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the
Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655–58 (2005) (distinguishing the Court’s
articulation of the Constitution’s operative propositions, which tell actors what they may do, from its
articulation of the rules to enforce the operative requirements); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 90–95 (2000) (explaining how over- and
underenforcement occurs through gaps between constitutional text and judicial doctrine).
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rights that the Court fails to uphold.248 Rather, by the Court’s own approach,
the remedy and right are mutually implicated. The one informs the meaning
of the other. This rights-dynamic relation means that by deciding on a
remedy, the Court constructs the practical meaning of the right. Conversely,
by urging a more robust rights-protective meaning, dissenters and scholars
urge a shift in the practical meaning of the right towards a different
conception of its relation to police practice.249
For the Court, social cost is the mediating concept between the right
and the remedy. In this rights–remedies relation under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court uses social cost as a way of shaping the remedy, and
in turn the available remedy shapes the meaning of the right. So, the Court
is not rights-essentialist, but remedy-centric and police-facilitative when it
comes to the constitutional meaning of the Fourth Amendment, mediated by
the import it places on avoiding substantial social costs. And to the extent
that this meaning depends on a conception of social cost that remains loose
and undefined, Fourth Amendment rights are shaped by a concept without
definite content. The Court has never undertaken the task of explaining what
counts as social cost and how to measure it. This approach is bad news for
citizens who want to know both what rights they have and whether the
judiciary stands ready to enforce them. But it does not have to be.
If rights and remedies are understood to be in a pragmatic relation, then
alternative cost determinations become possible that in turn shape the
practical meaning of the underlying Fourth Amendment rights.250 Perhaps
more than in the case of an idealized conception of a constitutional right, this
more flexible approach requires careful attention to particulars. This
dynamic can have the negative possibility that the meaning of the right
becomes a calcified version of the doctrine designed to protect it.251 But it

248 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 82–84 (distinguishing principle from policy); Fallon, supra
note 190, at 59 n.19 (distinguishing constitutional meaning from constitutional implementation); Owen
M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (1979) (advocating structural litigation
as a means of protecting “the true meaning of . . . constitutional value”).
249 Such a shift is to be distinguished from the minimalism advocated by scholars such as Professor
Cass Sunstein. See generally Cass Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006)
(advocating narrow and shallow constitutional decisions); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998) (criticizing Dworkinian moral readings of
the Constitution).
250 In this regard, Professor John Jeffries Jr. argues that a right–remedy gap can facilitate
constitutional change. Jeffries, supra note 155, at 98 (“[D]octrines that deny full individual remediation
reduce the cost of innovation, thereby advancing the growth and development of constitutional law” by
lowering the cost of change.).
251 See Roosevelt, supra note 247, at 1652 (“This mistaken equation of judicial doctrine and
constitutional command tends to warp doctrine, frequently at significant cost to constitutional
values . . . .”).
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can also make possible the creation of new constitutional meanings. Under a
flexible, pragmatic approach, a constitutional right does not have a meaning
independent from the dynamics of practical implementation and articulation
through which the Court fashions remedies.252 In this case, the justifications
for avoiding social costs become all the more important because of
their primary effects on the underlying meaning and scope of Fourth
Amendment privacy.
If avoiding social cost is a goal, and thinking about social cost requires
thinking holistically or systemically about the deterrent effects on police
practice—which, the Court worries, might lead to suboptimal amounts of
policing thereby harming society—then the Court should also stand ready to
think holistically and systemically about the effects of rights violations on
the political community. The idea of social cost appears to be about the
effects on the political community in which choices have already been made
concerning law, policy, and enforcement. When the Court leaves a rights
violation without a remedy in order to prevent a citizen lawbreaker from
going free, it purports to uphold values on which the political community has
already decided through its choice of criminal prohibitions and law
enforcement.253 A decision to avoid allowing a citizen lawbreaker to go free
is also a decision to free an official lawbreaker. We need not be rights
essentialists to see that when the Court leaves illegal police conduct
unpunished, it risks altering—or even debasing—the constitutional values
to which the political community is also committed as a matter of
fundamental law.
The Court spends very little effort analyzing the impact of its decisions
on constitutional values such as privacy, focusing instead on the effects of
its decisions on police practice.254 If the Court creates doctrine in order to
promote underlying constitutional values, then its exclusionary-rule
doctrines—focused on avoiding substantial social costs through the
vindication of constitutional rights—provide decision rules for law
enforcement officers that are unmoored from the constitutional meanings

252 See generally Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (explaining how judicial interpretation
of constitutional protections in criminal procedure creates a disconnect between law enforcement,
who focus on the impact of violating constitutional rights, and the general public, who focus on the
rights themselves).
253 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4–5 (1997).
254 See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) (neglecting to discuss privacy in
the majority opinion); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (discussing the attenuation doctrine
as basis for not applying the exclusionary rule without considering privacy interests).
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they are meant to preserve.255 These decision rules are not principally aimed
at creating or preserving constitutional values such as privacy or individual
liberty that the Fourth Amendment protects. Rather, they are aimed at a wider
conception of optimal public policing and thereby at facilitating government
practice through “readily administrable rules” and the like.256 In this way,
from an ideal privacy-protective perspective, the Court’s approach not only
fails to remedy harms to constitutional values the Fourth Amendment
protects but also fails to account for them.
This failure to account for harms to constitutional values arises not only
because the Court adjusts a decision rule to avoid the social costs of
overprotecting the right, but because the Court often does not account for the
effects of its decisions on the meaning and scope of Fourth Amendment
rights.257 There may indeed be good reasons to pursue the cost savings and
social benefits that misaligning decision rules and protected rights
achieves.258 And indeed, at times the Court’s qualified-immunity standard
sounds in this reasoning, seeking to avoid the more trivial litigation of
relatively minor incidents of negligent constitutional violations. On this
rationale, tort remedies might best be reserved for reckless police conduct in
order to avoid the costs that excessive overenforcement would create.
It is difficult, however, to credit this reasoning if the Court loses sight
of the right altogether. In order to make a claim about overenforcement, the
Court would need to perform a more precise accounting of the values left
unprotected than it does when it makes circular claims, as it did in Kentucky
v. King, that “[t]his holding provides ample protection for the privacy rights
that the Amendment protects.”259 In this case, in which evidence was not
suppressed when police forcibly entered a home under a claim of exigency
without a warrant and without knocking and announcing, the Court’s claim
of “ample protection” is delivered alongside little or no protection for
privacy rights. Such empty claims fail to provide any account of the meaning

255 See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004); Roosevelt,
supra note 247, at 1655 (detailing a theory that in many doctrinal areas the decision rules “separate” from
constitutional operative positions).
256 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
257 See Jeffries, supra note 140, at 262–64 (suggesting a standard of “clearly unconstitutional” rather
than “clearly established” in qualified-immunity cases to better protect constitutional meaning).
258 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 155, at 967 (“[I]t is fallacious to maintain that the Supreme Court
should not, as a general matter, take social costs into account when defining constitutional rights. Nor is
it specifically objectionable for the Court to take cognizance of the social costs of constitutional tort
litigation.”).
259 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011); see also, Crocker, supra note 30, at 718 (discussing
why this phrasing would be consistent with the Amendment protecting no privacy rights).
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of Fourth Amendment rights in the contexts of citizens’ lives and encounters
with police.
A claim that social cost mediates between right and remedy therefore
requires careful analysis of the meaning and calculation of social cost.260 It
might be beneficial to give meaning to more broadly construed rights with
incomplete remedies, perhaps as a way of maintaining an expressive
dimension to a desired normative ordering of constitutional rights.261
Admitting that perfect rights enforcement is unrealizable and undesirable,
we might view remedial deviation as inevitable and beneficial.262 Even so,
there would have to be a robust attempt to articulate the content of these
rights even in the judicial decisions that limit their remedial protection
because of the worry about excess social costs. In this regard, the Court’s
incantation of social cost when narrowing the exclusionary rule and when
expanding qualified immunity is entirely insufficient.
Social cost sounds like a calculus but is perhaps more accurately a
semantics—a way of explicating constitutional meaning in light of social
facts salient to the Court’s interpretive priorities. We know that the Court
counts underenforcement of criminal law, police hesitancy, and diversion of
police resources all as relevant social costs that weigh against more robust
rights protections. But we do not know the scale on which these costs are
calculated, nor any of the particulars about how to weigh privacy intrusions
against incremental effects of potential criminal law underenforcement or
police overdeterrence.
The debate between the majority and the dissent in Utah v. Strieff
illustrates this indeterminacy between semantics and calculus. From the
beginning, the majority explains that the Court has established a number of
exceptions to applying the exclusionary rule because “the significant costs
of this rule have led us to deem it ‘applicable only . . . where its deterrence
benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’”263 A law enforcement officer
had illegally stopped and detained Strieff, gathered his identification and
260

See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 155, at 939 (“Sometimes we may be best off, on balance, with
relatively expansive definitions of rights but with limitations on damages remedies that would make those
rights’ social costs inordinately large.”)
261 See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650–
51 (2000); RAINER FORST, NORMATIVITY AND POWER: ANALYZING SOCIAL ORDERS OF JUSTIFICATION
55–57 (2018). See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995) (exploring the relationship between social meanings and the broad construction of rights in
accordance with these meanings).
262 See Fallon, supra note 155, at 968 (“[I]t may sometimes be better to have more broadly defined
rights with a set of partially incomplete remedies than to have individually effective remedies for every
constitutional violation.”); Jeffries, supra note 155, at 87–90.
263 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
591 (2006)).
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sought information about any outstanding warrants that might exist. Finding
one, the officer arrested Strieff and conducted a search incident to arrest that
discovered illegal narcotics.264
Even though the stop and subsequent discovery of an outstanding traffic
violation were based on illegal police conduct, the Court nonetheless applied
its attenuation doctrine to hold that the discovery of a valid arrest warrant
was an intervening event between the initial illegality and the subsequent
discovery of evidence.265 Because the causal chain was attenuated, the Court
concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply. This attenuation doctrine
applies because of the need to avoid the “substantial social costs” of
excluding evidence without any discussion of the constitutional values at
stake in the decision. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was no
“purposeful or flagrant” illegality, but rather an isolated instance of
negligence.266 In the Court’s view of police practice, application of the
attenuation doctrine to such illegal stops is unlikely to incentivize police to
make use of this new application of the doctrine to go fishing for outstanding
warrants. Since the officer’s conduct was not “wanton,” Justice Thomas
reasoned for the Court, and since the exclusionary remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations imposes high social costs, the implied cost calculus
weighed against imposing a rights-based limit on official illegality. Absent
from the majority’s opinion is any consideration of the actual social costs on
which its opinion is premised.
Writing for herself and Justice Ginsburg in dissent, Justice Sotomayor
took the social cost calculation seriously. First, she called attention to the
costs that Mapp v. Ohio first identified that occur when the state exploits
illegally obtained evidence.267 Second, Justice Sotomayor examined the
social and political circumstances: Utah has over 180,000 warrants in its
database, providing ample reasons for a police officer—now protected by
attenuation—to go fishing for a traffic warrant. As the dissent argues, the
warrant check was not an intervening event, but “was part and parcel of the
officer’s illegal expedition for evidence in the hope that something might
turn up.”268 Indeed, it is standard procedure in the Salt Lake City Police
Department to stop individuals, obtain identification, and check for
outstanding warrants.

264

Id. at 2060.
Id. at 2061–63.
266 Id. at 2062–64 (“For the violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than
the mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.”).
267 Id. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 2066 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
605 (1975)).
265
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As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent details, such procedures are common
across the nation.269 If any substantial number of such stops target individuals
without reasonable suspicion, then the social costs of police illegality are
both widespread and invisible within the majority’s doctrinal approach. Not
only does the Court incentivize police to engage in illegal practices, secure
in the knowledge that a successful warrant check will attenuate the legal
consequences of their actions, but “[w]e also risk treating members of our
communities as second-class citizens.”270 Moreover, the distributional effects
on equal citizenship of allowing police to engage in warrant-fishing
expeditions will not always be equally targeted according to race
and class.271 As Justice Sotomayor observed, “it is no secret that people
of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny.”272 In this
way, the social costs will not be distributed evenly across communities,
which can create divergent perceptions of the adequacy and constitutionality
of policing practices.
Because of the kinds of widespread social costs the attenuation doctrine
entails—itself a doctrine about how not to enforce a remedy for a
constitutional violation—and because the Court makes no attempt to
incorporate them into any understanding of the exclusionary rule’s costs, the
rights–remedy gap is not a product of calculation. It is the result of normative
commitments. What is salient for the Court is minimizing the costs to
policing and thereby facilitating the fulfillment of arrest warrants, no matter
the manner in which they were discovered.273
In structuring the citizen–police encounter, only a “purposeful or
flagrant violation” rises to the level of a cognizable Fourth Amendment
violation when other factors exist to attenuate the very meaning of the right.
At least when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the meaning of the right

269

Id. at 2069.
Id.
271 See Devon W., Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L, REV. 946, 964–74
(2002); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 772–74 (2012); see also
Kahan & Meares, supra note 162, at 1176–77 (arguing that policing components should be balanced by
citizens, not judges, because they face “a heightened risk of criminal victimization”). See generally
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265
(1998) (describing the disproportionate impact of Fourth Amendment underenforcement along class and
racial lines).
272 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070.
273 On the importance of normative commitments to evaluating policing practice, see Harmon, supra
note 271, at 790. She notes: “Effective governance of the police requires a normative framework for
assessing whether constitutionally permissible policing practices properly balance efficacy against
individual and social harms.” Id.
270
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is what it does to structure a political community’s interactions with law
enforcement authority.274 As Justice Sotomayor argues in Strieff:
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double consciousness, this case
tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify
your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while
courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of
a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged. 275

So while the majority in Strieff nominally grants that there is an
underlying rights violation, the meaning of Fourth Amendment protected
privacy—its role in structuring the everyday political lives of citizens—plays
no role in the analysis. The Court construes social cost to encompass only
those costs of police and criminal law underenforcement, not the
underenforcement of Fourth Amendment rights. The majority and dissent
differ over how to calculate social costs, with only the latter undertaking an
effort to recognize the comprehensive effects of authorizing a systemically
employed policing practice.
Even though on closer inspection social cost becomes a semantics
through which the Court gives salient priority to policing practices over
rights-violations, the doctrinal concept remains available as a source of
calculation, as the dissents in Strieff illustrate.276 The narrowness of the
Court’s approach also belies the importance of analyzing social cost with
greater accuracy. Fourth Amendment rights are held by “the people,”
suggesting that the rights in question are constitutive of a political
community that is itself sovereign over incidental exercises of policing
power.277 The issue of social cost is thus not merely about underenforcement

274 This realization is apparent in Justice Sotomayor’s approach to the Fourth Amendment. See
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I would add that unlawful ‘stops’ have severe
consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name.”); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that “by making available at a relatively low
cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the government, in its
unfettered discretion, chooses to track—[GPS monitoring] may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society’” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))); Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice
Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice, 123 YALE L.J. F. 525, 532–35 (2014); Crocker,
supra note 30, at 702–14.
275 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
276 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s opinion increases
“[t]he officer’s incentive to violate the Constitution”).
277 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151–52 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Protective
of the fundamental ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ the
Amendment ‘is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents.’”
(first quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; and then quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting))).
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of a right against a particular individual, but the constitution of the political
community. The core question of social cost for the political community
becomes how to understand social cost more comprehensively, and to make
clear why it matters.
B. Inverting Broken Windows and the Social Cost of Insecurity
As a matter of internal criticism or critique, the Court’s focus on the
social costs of the exclusionary rule creates the doctrinal opening to provide
a more accurate and comprehensive accounting for social cost. Because the
Court makes social cost relevant to the meaning and scope of the Fourth
Amendment, the critical task is to explain how social cost accounting can be
used to make visible the unseen costs to the justice system from low-level,
yet systemic, unconstitutional police behavior. In this way, social cost
accounting can be viewed as the inversion of order-maintenance policing.
In pursuit of order-maintenance policing, the Court adopted a flexible
approach to enable greater police discretion aimed at maintaining social
order over low-level street crime.278 The motivating idea behind brokenwindows policing was that by maintaining the social order against relatively
minor crime, police could establish norms of law abidingness within
communities that would forestall cycles of increasing crime.279 In order to
facilitate more proactive policing practices, the Court needed to relax
enforcement of Fourth Amendment rules, and police needed to transgress
constitutional limits in discretionary practice aimed at achieving greater
social benefits from increased crime control and legal-norm compliance.
Social cost accounting has an inverse logic. In pursuit of a more
accurate cost accounting, the Court would acknowledge as legally relevant,
and thereby make visible, the costs suffered by communities by low-level
law enforcement criminality. And by adopting a less flexible approach to
Fourth Amendment rules, the Court would force police to internalize
constitutional norms as constitutive features of their practices, thereby
278
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1968); Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063–64; Hiibel v. Sixth Jud.
Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004).
279 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 30, at 32 (“A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a
window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy.
Families move out, unattached adults move in . . . . Fights occur. Litter accumulates.”); Dan M. Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1997) (“Cracking down
on . . . visible signs of disorder may be justified on this ground, since disorderly behavior and the law’s
response to it are cues about the community’s attitude toward more serious forms of criminal
wrongdoing.”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 805, 806 (1998) (“By shaping preferences for crime, accentuating the perceived status of
lawbreaking, and enfeebling the institutions that normally hold criminal propensities in check, disorderly
norms create crime.”); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65–84 (1990).
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protecting communities from more pervasive law enforcement illegality. If
broken-windows policing is structurally about the disorder that comes from
minor criminality, then similar structural effects should follow from the kind
of disorder produced by minor criminality when conducted by police.280
Pervasive minor police criminality from underenforced constitutional
violations has large aggregate effects, producing an overall climate
among communities.
But unchecked systemic illegality will also sometimes irrupt into major
instances of criminality, as George Floyd’s and Breonna Taylor’s deaths
illustrate. This dynamic is the inversion of the broken-windows logic,
whereby policing itself produces the social disorder.281 But unlike citizenproduced social disorder, a police-created legal disorder reflexively risks
undermining not only legal legitimacy, but also the structural relations of
democratic government.282 A legal community that tolerates pervasive police
criminal wrongdoing signals a lack of attachment to its own basic

280 In general, choice of level policing and type of policing—order maintenance, etc.—produces
different systemic effects which, at any given time, citizens are tempted to treat as inevitable or natural.
See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 90–92 (2001). Within these choices, however, there are discretionary opportunities for police
tactics to include copious illegality and abuse, as the case of Baltimore exemplifies. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 5 (Aug. 10, 2016); Radley
Balko, An Interview with the Baltimore Cop Who’s Revealing All the Horrible Things He Saw on the Job,
WASH. POST (June 25, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2015/06/25/an-interview-with-the-baltimore-cop-whos-revealing-all-the-horrible-things-hesaw-on-the-job [https://perma.cc/3JK6-MDVP].
281 Although there are reasons to doubt the empirical foundations of broken-windows policing, the
correlative concern over inverted broken windows relies on different contextual basis. See HARCOURT,
supra note 30, at 88–89. First, unlike ordinary crime, where the concern is not that one cracked window
leads to very many broken windows, the inverted logic applied to police is that one act of illegality—
stops without reasonable suspicion increase because police have incentives to break the law—will lead
to systematic perpetration of acts of similar kind. Communities can expect a lot more of the same kind of
illegality. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2073–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s opinion will
create more police illegality). But second, following broken-windows logic, it is reasonable to believe
that police illegality and unaccountability at the street level regarding stops and seizures, for example,
will lead to greater forms of illegality that result in more police brutality and death. This logic is not a
slippery slope, but a causal consequence of the legal community’s toleration of illegality and approval of
unaccountability. For the expectation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that police will employ
investigatory practices unless explicitly prohibited by enforceable constitutional rules. See Stephen
Rushin & Griffin Edwards, An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling, 73 STAN.
L. REV. 637, 649–50, 657–64 (2021) (demonstrating that Whren v. United States, which held that
pretextual stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment, produces more traffic stops of persons of color).
Indeed, the implication of qualified immunity is that police will not be deterred from effective
enforcement activities unless there is a factually precise precedent proclaiming otherwise.
282 See Sklansky, supra note 157, at 1702–03; Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic
Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2015); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795–1801 (2005); Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of
Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2057–58 (2017).
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commitments, which reflexively undermines the constitutional basis of its
own normative order. In this way, through choice of Fourth Amendment
enforcement priorities, we choose our forms of disorder as well as the
normative orders by which we organize social and political life.283
Because democratic life also requires security in order to protect the
public spaces in which the ideal of democratic deliberation can occur, it is
tempting to argue for a normative order that prioritizes policing as a way of
facilitating the enjoyment of other political and civil rights. Indeed,
Professors Ian Loader and Neil Walker argue that we cannot fully enjoy any
of our other civil liberties if we are made insecure by crime in our
community, for “security is a valuable public good, a constitutive ingredient
of the good society,” which the state is obligated to provide.284 On this view,
security is also a right that functions as a necessary condition for the
enjoyment of other rights.285
If Loader and Walker are correct, then the critical task is not to advocate
eliminating the police, as some in the wake of George Floyd’s murder have
at least rhetorically claimed,286 but to establish more robust legal norms that
become constitutive of policing practice.287 But absent the instillment of
constitutive norms that make the provision of true security (bodily and
otherwise) the default response of police, violations of life and liberty at the
hands of police will continue to occur. They will operate on the doctrinal
algorithm that the Court has written—one with disparate and deadly impacts.
One hurdle, however, is that we can’t have constitutive norms of this
kind if the Supreme Court is at war with constitutional rules and remedies,
believing its task is to facilitate a particular historically contingent program
and theory of policing that broken-windows community policing represents.
But no matter the current trends, we should not forget that the Fourth
Amendment aims to protect a right of the people to be secure from the
exercise of state power that policing represents, even if policing seeks to

283 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 30, at 701 (arguing that “[d]ivergent views on constitutional
meaning can order alternative social and political practices by making available particular ways of
exercising the role of citizen or police”).
284 IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY 7 (2007).
285 As the philosopher Henry Shue puts the point: “No one can fully enjoy any right that is supposedly
protected by society if someone can credibly threaten him or her with murder, rape, beating, etc., when
he or she tries to enjoy the alleged right.” HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 21–22 (1980).
286 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The Emerging Movement for Police and Prison Abolition, NEW
YORKER (May 7, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-emerging-movementfor-police-and-prison-abolition [https://perma.cc/62KJ-255L].
287 LOADER & WALKER, supra note 284, at 195–233.
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protect the people from private assertions of power through criminal acts.288
With both security and liberty at stake, constitutional rules establish
necessary conditions for the possibility of minimizing the social costs of both
over- and underpolicing. In order to protect all of the people’s rights,
including their rights to security, the Court must adhere to the constitutional
expectation of its own doctrinal analysis—that the social costs both of
overpolicing and underenforcing constitutional norms will also count in the
overall calculation.
This analysis views the Court’s role in articulating the constitutional
meanings of Fourth Amendment rights as a necessary condition for enjoying
both rights to security and liberty.289 Focusing on policing’s role in
maintaining community safety, Professor William Stuntz has argued that the
proper level of policing is tethered to the level and kind of criminality that a
community seeks to avoid, so that when the threats change, so too must the
application of legal limitations on policing practice.290 Increasing the
restrictions constitutional rules create on policing practices, he argues,
thereby increases the social costs of fighting crime.291
This dynamic looks to be a zero-sum rights–security tradeoff. Inverted
broken-windows logic recognizes, however, that communities can be made
insecure from both private and police criminality. But there is a key
difference in the nature of the two kinds of insecurity. Unlike private
criminality, policing illegality—tolerated by underenforced constitutional
rules—has the power to create reflexive constitutional norms that define a
policing regime’s self-understanding of its powers and limits. Policing
illegality thereby creates both physical and normative insecurity. Rather than
a tradeoff, judicially tolerated police illegality makes us both less free and
less secure.292 To avoid descending into a Pareto inferior position whereby
288 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 180, at 131 (asking “whether the search-and-seizure power the
state has asserted could be generalized without destroying the people’s right of security”); see also
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2146 (2002) (“[T]he ‘rights’
vision of Fourth and Fifth Amendment law rests on an implausible assumption: that people care a
lot about assaults and invasions by the police but care little about similar assaults and invasions by
private parties.”).
289 Tweaking the tension between lawfulness and legitimacy, where police must practice the former
to have the latter, Professor Tracey Meares argues by contrast that we need to focus more on rightful
policing and less on the lawfulness of policing. Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference
Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—and Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1865, 1865–66 (2013). Rightful policing recognizes the discretionary elements of contextual
fairness and procedure that exist apart from law. Id. at 1866.
290 Stuntz, supra note 288, at 2147 (“[I]f serious crime rises, police authority ought to increase, and
if serious crime falls, it ought to decrease.”).
291 Id. at 2148–49.
292 For an analogous argument in the national security context, see DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL,
LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 17 (2007).
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everyone’s social welfare is worse off than it should be, any analysis of social
cost requires accounting for the systemic effects of Fourth Amendment rules
governing both the practice of policing and the constitutional norms of the
polity. Abandoning a narrow, police-facilitative approach to social cost thus
promotes a right to security alongside other civil rights and liberties that the
Fourth Amendment represents.
If we examine the narrowness of the Court’s reasoning in cases like
Herring, a police-centric calculation of costs has not always been the Court’s
principal focus. Concern for what the Court cannot see by focusing only
upon the case before it once motivated the construction of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. As Justice Jackson observed in a different era:
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts,
and then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating
evidence . . . . I am convinced that there are[] many unlawful searches of homes
and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in
which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we
never hear.293

These are the effects on the everyday lives, which can be quite expansive in
terms of possible job loss, reduction in social status, damage to one’s sense
of civic equality, and the like.294 Americans choose a public policy that
entails a certain approach to policing, and the Supreme Court sets the rules
that enable particular policing practices, though the effects are experienced
more like tragic choices—choices for which most do not wish to take
responsibility.295 When the rules require flagrant constitutional violations in
order to merit remedy, or when the Court focuses on the social costs of
underpolicing and not the social costs to the political community, then there

293 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 173 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“To sanction conduct such as this
case reveals is to encourage police intrusions upon privacy . . . . [I]t is important to remember that police
conduct is not often subjected to judicial scrutiny.”); Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect
Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315,
343 tbl.6 (2004) (reporting findings of large numbers of unconstitutional searches in everyday
police practice).
294 See Reich, supra note 31, at 1172 (“The good society must have its hiding places—its protected
crannies for the soul.”).
295 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility,
3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 363, 366–68, 375 (2004) (“Discretionary policing involves a tradeoff—a
tradeoff that we make with full knowledge. The most important thing in the public policy debates, then,
is to decide, with eyes wide open and brutal honesty, how much unconstitutionality we are prepared to
live with . . . .”). See generally CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 57 (originating and framing the
concept of tragic choices as a problem of scarce resources).
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will be unquantified, yet substantial, unseen social costs.296 Whether these
are the social costs that count towards the Court’s calibration of tolerable
rights violations and required remediation is a central question for the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Practical Effects of Uncalculated Costs:
Community Costs and Black Lives Matter
The case of Breonna Taylor, whose death at the hands of police in
March 2020 produced protests and social unrest, is illustrative of the
uncalculated social costs police practices, such as reliance on no-knock
warrants, produce.297 Having obtained a no-knock search warrant, officers
from the Louisville Metro Police Department entered Taylor’s apartment as
part of a narcotics investigation that also involved Kenneth Walker, who was
also staying at her apartment.298 Thinking intruders were entering, Mr.
Walker fired his weapon once in warning, whereupon the entering officers
returned fire, hitting Ms. Taylor six times and killing her.299
Law enforcement officers obtained the no-knock warrant under claims
that were likely insufficient to support such a warrant under Supreme Court
precedent in Richards v. Wisconsin, which held that there was no blanket
narcotics investigation exigency that would justify no-knock entries.300 The
warrant affidavit’s basis for seeking permission for a no-knock entry
involved boiler-plate language about the nature of narcotics investigations of

296 See Steiker, supra note 252, at 2468–71; Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 790 (1970) (“[T]he Supreme Court simply
never gets to see many of the police practices that raise the most pervasive and significant issues of
suspects’ rights.”).
297 See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What to Know
About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonnataylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/N5W5-EXUK]; Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, Minute by Minute:
What Happened the Night Louisville Police Fatally Shot Breonna Taylor, USA TODAY (May 15, 2020,
9:45 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/15/minute-minute-account-breonnataylor-fatal-shooting-louisville-police/5196867002/ [https://perma.cc/4GGQ-SE8A].
298 See Radley Balko, The No-Knock Warrant for Breonna Taylor Was Illegal, WASH. POST (June 3,
2020, 4:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/no-knock-warrant-breonnataylor-was-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/YMP3-VYDE]; David Alan Sklansky & Sharon Driscoll,
Stanford’s David Sklansky on the Breonna Taylor Case, No-Knock Warrants, and Reform,
STAN. L. SCH. (Sept. 28, 2020), https://law.stanford.edu/2020/09/28/stanfords-david-sklansky-on-thebreonna-taylor-case-no-knock-warrants-and-reform/ [https://perma.cc/T3F5-SZPL]; Jemele Hill, Stop
Calling Breonna Taylor’s Killing a ‘Tragedy,’ ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2020/09/tragedy-means-blaming-black-people/616528/ [https://perma.cc/3YMQ-8KJ6].
299 Sklansky & Driscoll, supra note 298.
300 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) (holding that “Wisconsin’s blanket rule impermissibly insulates these
cases from judicial review”).
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the kind that the Court had rejected in Richards.301 For without some more
specific showing about the particularities of an individual search, the idea
that searches in narcotics investigations incur risks justifying no-knock
entries would render no-knock entries reasonable for all such searches as a
class—a proposition the Court rejected.302 Despite this likely constitutional
deficiency, the Court’s analysis in Hudson v. Michigan makes such
distinctions irrelevant in practice, because police have every incentive to
enter unannounced whether armed with a no-knock warrant or entering in
violation of the rule.303
If, as the Court reasons, the social costs are all on the side of curtailing
police practice, not on community harms, then police have every incentive
to expand the use of such entries without fear of losing evidence through
exclusion. Were it not for the tragedy that followed law enforcement’s entry
in this case, Americans would not know about Ms. Taylor, and the practice
of no-knock entries would go largely unnoticed to those outside of
communities often subject to them. The lack of broader acknowledgment in
the less tragic but more frequent cases, however, does not mean that the
social cost is low.304
After George Floyd was killed by police while in custody in
Minneapolis in May 2020,305 widespread protests followed in cities across
the country, where the combined frustration at cases like Ms. Taylor’s and
Mr. Floyd’s deaths demonstrated that communities which are subject to
threat of police violence or no-knock entries suffer widespread social costs
too.306 These costs are borne not only by individuals who suffer tragic deaths
301

See id. at 394; United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35–36 (2003); Balko, supra note 298; Ray
Sanchez, Laws Ending No-Knock Warrants After Breonna Taylor’s Death Are ‘a Big Deal’ but Not
Enough, CNN (Oct. 10, 2020, 6:03 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/10/us/no-knock-warrant-bansbreonna-taylor/index.html [https://perma.cc/669K-KSCF]; Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Louisville Officer
Who Shot Breonna Taylor Will Be Fired, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/29/us/louisville-officer-fired-jaynes-breonna-taylor.html [https://perma.cc/B4VP-SYLJ].
302 Richards, 520 U.S. at 393.
303 See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.
304 Permissive background rules allowing everyday police activity such as arrests also increase the
possibility of legal use of deadly force. As Professor Harmon notes, “[R]ecent high-profile killings by
police officers underscore that every arrest involves a confrontation between a suspect and a police officer
that can go badly awry. Once a police officer attempts an arrest, he is authorized to use force, sometimes
deadly force, to enforce that decision.” Harmon, Why Arrest?, supra note 16, at 315.
305 Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley Willis & Robin Stein,
How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/C5TE-TK2M].
306 Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/KN6Q-S4ZN];
Helier Cheung, George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This Time, BBC NEWS (June 8,
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from police actions that qualified immunity shields but also by individuals
and their communities who are subjected to similar illegality that remains
less visible because it is less tragic. The aggregate costs of relatively minor
constitutional violations that the Court does not enforce can be quite large
for the communities who suffer them and can shape the public life of
individuals in ways that affect not only their persons, but their political lives
as well.307 Nonetheless, these are costs that the Court imposes upon
communities through its choice of default constitutional rules and its choice
of qualified-immunity standards. These choices articulate what counts as
reasonable police conduct in particular situations as well as what counts as
cognizable constitutional claims for remedies to illegal police conduct.
To treat Black Lives Matter protests in the wake of the shooting of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri or in the wake of Officer Chauvin’s
murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis as isolated events is to miss the
movement’s motivation.308 The aggregation of small-scale police illegality
immune to civil damages or the exclusionary rule is like the aggregation of
small-scale illegality that broken windows represents. Both are capable of
irrupting into a significant event such as the public murder of an unarmed
citizen by a police officer but are also otherwise capable of defining the daily
experience in a community.
Black Lives Matter protests invoke an inverse broken-windows logic.
In order to prevent the deaths by police of persons like Breonna Taylor, we
must address everyday unconstitutionality at its source—the constitutive
failure of police to embody constitutional norms and to engage in practices
that comply with constitutional rules despite the limited availability of
constitutional remedies for those harmed. As a social movement, Black Lives
Matter encompasses a wide set of claims and concerns about racial and social
justice. But the occasion for its call for a reformed democratic politics begins
with Fourth Amendment doctrines that leave constitutional harms
unremedied in individual cases but are nonetheless capable of producing

2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905 [https://perma.cc/6CC5-265G]; Elaine
Godfrey, The Enormous Scale of This Movement, ATLANTIC (June 7, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/protest-dc-george-floyd-police-reform/612748/
[https://perma.cc/TCT4-U6SW].
307 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 178–220 (2010) (analyzing the total community costs of systemic racial inequality in
the administration of criminal justice).
308 See Jordan T. Camp & Christina Heatherton, Introduction: Policing the Planet, in POLICING THE
PLANET: WHY THE POLICING CRISIS LED TO BLACK LIVES MATTER 1, 6 (Jordan T. Camp & Christina
Heatherton eds., 2016); Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed
[https://perma.cc/5FN2-6JKA].
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substantial aggregate harm.309 Elsewhere in constitutional doctrine, the Court
establishes the equal dignity of all persons to be free from the stigmatizing
effects of illegal use of state power, which the targeting of communities for
particular kinds of policing freed from strict adherence to constitutional
norms exemplifies.310 When it comes to the Fourth Amendment’s role—even
on the Court’s own police-centric perspective—whether the Court dials up
or down the level of scrutiny of the episodic events that create claims for
evidence exclusion has aggregate effects through the systemic use of
everyday police tactics.
What is the aggregate social cost of lives erroneously cut short through
ineffective de-escalation techniques, overly aggressive policing, overuse of
no-knock warrants, and related practices?311 Aggregating these other costs
would permit a more accurate accounting of total costs. Without these,
narrow judicial focus on the costs of exclusion to police as well as society’s
interest in criminal law enforcement can only be partial and incomplete.
Scholars, for example, have been able to document the loss of trust in police
and the effects on communities from street encounters.312 Giving a precise
account of these broader social costs—like the value of the lives cut short,
or the impacts on freedom of movement as well as a sense of political
inclusion—remains difficult, but no more so than the alternative social costs
on which the Court relies, without quantification, in cases like Herring and
Hudson. Relaxing constitutional standards in order to permit less fettered
policing is not cost-free for either the individuals in communities subject to
greater scrutiny or for the polity at large.

309 On the political implications for the movement, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRITIQUE AND
PRAXIS: A CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ILLUSIONS, VALUES, AND ACTION 365–72 (2020).
310 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (protecting a right to “dignity as free
persons” on an equal basis); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“[Same-sex couples]
ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”); see also Laurence
H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“Lawrence, more than any other decision in the Supreme Court’s history,
both presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationally situated theory of
substantive liberty.”).
311 See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1191–93 (2017)
(analyzing the effects of permissive seizure rules on police violence).
312 Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 90
(2004); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 BOS. U.
L. REV. 361, 366–68 (2001); Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police
Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 191 (2009) (“[T]he knowledge that the police are permitted
to participate in crime, even for justifiable ends, erodes public trust in the police.”). But see Bell, supra
note 282, at 2066–67 (arguing that legitimacy is not enough if communities are estranged from the law,
believing that law itself works against them).
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D. Calculating Total Social Costs and
Constructing Constitutional Meaning
From the minor cases that do not ever reach the Court to the highly
salient and visible cases that spark nationwide protests, the conduct of police
in situations for which the exclusionary rule is said to offer too little deterrent
benefit can produce both widely dispersed and tragically local costs that
remain unacknowledged and uncalculated by the Court’s social cost analysis.
What produces this disconnect? How can this internal inconsistency in
Fourth Amendment doctrine and meaning be overcome?
First, the Court needs a wider frame. As I have canvassed in the case
law, the Court casts a narrow gaze when looking for costs and benefits of the
exclusionary remedy. Finding merely negligent police conduct insufficient
to warrant depriving the criminal justice system of the benefits of criminal
prosecutions, the Court requires reckless police behavior before conceding
that deterring similar behavior is required.313 Such a high showing alone
guarantees greater prevalence of negligent police conduct with harms that
are likely to go without remedy. Employing a limited conception of social
cost, moreover, the Court analyzes benefits entirely upon salutary effects on
police behavior and costs entirely as losses related to criminal adjudication.
In failing to recognize the existence of social costs beyond those
incurred by letting lawbreakers go free, the Court engages in what is the
equivalent of Coasean half-measures.314 The Court cannot begin to properly
analyze doctrinal rules for distributing social costs and avoiding greater
harms if it does not even notice the full range of costs its remedies (or lack
thereof) impose, thereby failing to analyze the social situation as it actually
exists. In order to make a rational calculation of how to assess social costs,
the Court has to have in view the costs on each side of the ledger—the cost
of letting the citizen lawbreaker go free and the cost of letting the illegal
police conduct go without a remedy.
Second, to truly account for the full social cost of illegal police conduct,
the Court must also consider alternative values and rights protected by the
Fourth Amendment, particularly those that counter the Court’s current
police-practice focus. Having too narrow a conceptualization of social cost
follows from the Court’s overriding goal of regulating police practice
through constructing Fourth Amendment meaning. Accounting for the social
cost of allowing the individual lawbreaker to go free emphasizes the
313 See Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
2–3 (2012).
314 Coase, supra note 42, at 43 (arguing “that the choice between different social arrangements for
the solution of economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total effect
of these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account”).
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instrumental rationality of the police perspective. Police must be empowered
to maintain public order by preventing crime, or at least not constitutionally
inhibited from doing so. From this perspective, constitutional provisions are
not to be understood as opposing this instrumental rationality—they are
designed to facilitate it.
Even if Fourth Amendment rules sometimes curtail the means by which
police may pursue their goals, under the instrumental approach the costs are
to be minimized and no set of values and policing norms need be
internalized.315 The goal is to make Fourth Amendment rules easy for police
in order to empower them. As the Court in Kentucky v. King makes clear, for
example, police should not be forced to engage in “burdensome” formal
constitutional procedures or have courts “unjustifiably interfere[] with
legitimate law enforcement strategies.”316 Absent extreme conduct, the costs
of everyday and ordinary police illegality must be borne by the citizens
against whom they are perpetrated so that the Fourth Amendment can
provide rules that facilitate—rather than inhibit—police power. In order to
make their costs count, the Court must adopt new constitutional priorities
that enable better cost accounting than the existing priority of regulating
police provides.
Under the Court’s current approach, the Court never focuses on what a
citizen should expect of a law enforcement officer. The Court seldom
emphasizes the duties police officers owe to tread cautiously in light of the
rights of citizens at stake. Rather, the Court encourages police—under its
qualified-immunity doctrine in particular—to always act unless the rule
makes crystal clear that their actions are forbidden.317 By contrast, an
approach that adopts the citizen rights-holder perspective would require
police to act in a way that anticipates the possibility that their actions might
not only fail to comply with the letter of the law, but with the spirit of the
law. By internalizing constitutional norms, it is possible to achieve Pareto
superior outcomes—better law enforcement and better rights-protecting
policing practices.
Third, as a corollary to shifting its perspectival priorities, the Court
should recognize that its own role in establishing doctrinal rules has

315 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (constraining circumstances when police
may search an automobile incident to arrest). Where the majority opinion emphasized the privacy
interests, Justice Alito, writing in dissent, did not mention the concept at all, focusing instead on the need
to provide clear rules for police and the expectations of searches incident to arrest that already existed in
policing practice. Id. at 360–61 (Alito, J., dissenting). Minimal conduct rules are all that are needed on
this perspective.
316 563 U.S. 452, 466–67 (2011).
317 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
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implications not simply for police practice, but also for the lives of citizens.318
The Court is not a neutral arbiter of constitutional value, but an active
participant in establishing constitutional meanings that shape the experiences
of individuals and communities through their interactions with alternative
policing practices. One of the stated costs of a more robust exclusionary rule
that the Court cites is the possibility that police would be timid in their
investigation more so than the Constitution should require, thereby
depriving the polity of reliable evidence of criminal wrongdoing. By
prioritizing this consideration, the Court plays a role in shaping everyday
street-level experiences.
One of the unrecognized costs of systemic policing practices that
violate the Constitution is the related timidity citizens experience in their
relation to government and community. Unconstitutional practices signal to
some citizens that their rights do not matter and that their place within the
polity is unequal. In this way, policing practices play a role in shaping the
political community. Constitutional law is not a matter of arid and abstract
principle but becomes a lived experience within communities who are
subject, for example, to more widespread use of no-knock entries because
the Court finds constitutional violations too attenuated to remedy.
A shift in perspective to ask how policing practices are experienced by
individuals and communities brings into view different considerations. In her
Utah v. Strieff dissent, for example, Justice Sotomayor has called for the
Court to shift its Fourth Amendment perspective to take a wider view of the
social costs and distributional effects of (illegal) policing practices on the
political community.319 For those harassed by these and other ordermaintenance priorities, such as stop and frisks, who have engaged in no
criminal wrongdoing and against whom no evidence is acquired, the
exclusionary remedy does not matter even though social costs obtain.320
318 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 282, at 2140 (“[P]olicing cases—more than others—send messages
about social inclusion and, indeed, social citizenship.”); Crocker, supra note 38, at 363–71 (analyzing the
effects of Fourth Amendment doctrine on citizens’ lives with the example of the interpretation of the
Amendment’s protection of houses); CROCKER, supra note 40, at 263 (“What it means to have a
constitutional government is to be committed to governing within the terms and norms of a constitution.
It means that these values, principles, and practices play a role in structuring how we think about and how
we respond to the inevitable crises of human affairs.”).
319
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
320 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that New
York’s stop-and-frisk practices violated the Constitution). These costs can be disproportionately borne
by racial minorities. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship,
and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011) (observing that “[r]acial minorities
face the double bind of being subject to both underenforcement and overenforcement” of criminal law);
David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 43–44 (1994)
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Abstract principles do not produce these costs. The Court’s adoption of
contingent perspectives that prioritize the police or that pursue
undercalculated notions of equilibrium produces these costs. If the Court
were to focus on the costs borne not just by persons made to feel less a part
of the self-governing citizenry but also by those seeking to live their lives in
freedom from “a too permeating police presence,”321 then very different
experiences of social and political life would follow.
Fourth, the Fourth Amendment’s structural role in protecting a right of
the people requires looking at the holistic effects of the rules the Court
adopts.322 As Justice Sotomayor notes in her Strieff dissent, the Court’s
exclusionary-rule doctrine affects the respect that self-governing citizens are
owed by public officials.323 When communities are targeted for stops and
frisks, or made fearful of the risk of no-knock entries, their ability to
experience the full and equal status as participants in democratic selfgovernance is harmed.324 The role of police in a community is not simply a
function of local democratic decision-making. Rather, the practice of
policing within a community shapes democratic inclusion and participation
by conferring or withholding respect and the liberty to go about daily
activities free from police intrusion.
These effects on participation in turn reflexively inform the democratic
legitimacy of local democratic decisions about the kinds of police practices
a community will have. But at its most basic level, a Fourth Amendmentrights limitation on policing practice is a structural check on the power of
government.325 When the Court refuses to implement this structural check by
withdrawing access to remedies for constitutional violations, then the
relative power of government grows against the equally important power of
the people to engage in self-government free from intrusion and

(arguing that Terry’s effects “most heavily burden members of minority groups, especially AfricanAmericans”); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1277 (1998) (explaining how Terry “authorized a police practice
that was being used to subvert the Fourth Amendment rights of blacks nationwide”).
321
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
322 See Crocker, supra note 38, at 354–71.
323 136 S. Ct. at 2069–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
324 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 157, at 1771–74, 1797–99; BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED:
POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 92–113 (2017).
325 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 168, at 215–220 (2020) (arguing that Fourth Amendment
protections for the home play a structural role within the Constitution).
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interference.326 Thus, an accurate accounting for social cost must include the
effects on constitutional structure.
No doubt, this is a big frame with inchoate costs. But given the fact that
the broader social costs on which the Court already relies do not admit of
definite calculation, the inchoate nature of this larger structural issue does
not render it any less a constituent feature of social cost. Following Justice
Sotomayor’s leadership, acknowledging that violations of these structural
features are a cost is a necessary condition for the possibility of developing
a calculus that accounts for them.
CONCLUSION
When considering the appropriate remedy—or whether to impose a
remedy at all—for Fourth Amendment rights violations, “[t]he problem is to
avoid the more serious harm.”327 This question lies at the heart of social
movements and critical calls for police reform.328 It is also a central question
of Fourth Amendment meaning. Under the Supreme Court’s remedial
doctrines, social cost is a central concept used to calibrate available remedies
for law enforcement illegality.
But social cost relies on choices of perspective and judgments about
what counts as salient harms that necessitate remedy. The result of
prioritizing a policing perspective is to focus on the harms produced by
imposing the exclusionary rule or civil liability on law enforcement’s illegal
acts. By contrast, the Court remains blind in its social cost calculations to
harms imposed by unlawful police conduct upon broader communities as
well as innocent individuals. Such blindness is a problem because it
constructs constitutional meaning in a way that excludes much of what
scholars and the public take the Fourth Amendment to mean through the
values it protects. Harms that flow from those citizens who are law
enforcement officers—those empowered with the authority to search,
arrest, employ violence, and use deadly force—and that break the law
may be particularly acute given the special role they play in political society.
In this way, the Fourth Amendment also plays a structural role in separating

326 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–78 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (making a similar point in the
context of free speech and assembly).
327 Coase, supra note 42, at 2.
328 See Bell, supra note 282, at 2067 (analyzing “the real problem of policing: at both an interactional
and structural level, current regimes can operate to effectively banish whole communities from
the body politic”); Harmon, Federal Programs, supra note 16, at 873 (analyzing how federal “programs
may make local policing seemingly cheaper for communities but less efficient overall by increasing
collateral harm”).
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the powers and privacies of the people from the policing power of
law enforcement.
By engaging in internal criticism of Supreme Court doctrine, this
Article begins with the Court’s own commitment to the analytic centrality of
social cost. This commitment implies the necessity of providing a more
accurate accounting for social costs as a constitutive element of Fourth
Amendment rights protections. Having adapted the Fourth Amendment to
modern policing practices, the Court cannot object to correcting an
inaccurate social cost calculation because a social movement urges it to do
so.329 Calls for contemporary police reform must have their analogue in
recognizing the necessity to recalibrate the social cost calculus the Court
employs when constructing the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Focusing only on the social cost of regulating police through constitutional
remedies fails to account for the broader social costs that policing practices
backed by judicial doctrine impose upon communities.
If social cost is relevant to the meaning and scope of the Fourth
Amendment, as the Court instructs, then the problem is how to conceptualize
and calculate the more dispersed harms that arise from systemic practices
that violate the Constitution and invade privacy. This issue of calculation
depends foremost on a prior issue of conceptual clarification concerning the
nature of these harms and how they relate to constitutional meanings, thereby
making it possible to confront the problem of social cost that Fourth
Amendment doctrine presents. The issue of accurate calculation also requires
actual calculation, rather than empty doctrinal incantations claiming that
constitutional remedies produce social costs. Otherwise, the fundamental
problem is that the Court nominally invokes a social cost calculation that
fails to include all relevant costs, but in reality does not calculate anything
at all.

329 Many developments in constitutional law and doctrine are the product of social movement
advocacy. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L, REV. 1737, 1756, 1804–05
(2007) (charting changes to constitutional meanings entrenched through the historical accomplishments
of We the People); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (arguing that “Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the
Second Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth century through popular constitutionalism”);
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927,
928–29 (2006) (“When [social] movements succeed in contesting the application of constitutional
principles, they can help change the social meaning of constitutional principles and the practices
they regulate.”).
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